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The paper aims at assessing the specific impact of shallow versus deep integra-
tion between Mediterranean (MED) countries
1 and their partners in the European 
Union (EU) as well as between the MED countries themselves. It relies on dataset 
developed for this project concerning tariffs (as a proxy for shallow integration) 
and Non Tariff Measures (NTMs)
2 (as a proxy for deep integration). Additional 
data are also included in order to take into account  other trade costs, especially 
transport costs and logistics costs. In this regard, an original dataset of maritime 
freight cost (Maersk, 2007) is introduced as well as the trade logistics performance 
(TLP) index produced by the World Bank. Such datasets are useful for providing 
additional insight into deep integration. 
The paper starts by calculating the magnitude of NTMs in terms of ad valorem 
tariff equivalent (AVEs). The estimation of NTMs through ad valorem equivalents 
(AVEs) shows that Algeria and Jordan have the hig hest value of AVEs, whereas 
Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt have the lowest value. A gravity model is then esti-
mated with special emphasis on trade costs which are the crucial point in our r e-
search study. Given the limitation of data on NTMs, the gravity model is estimated 
for only one year (2001), and for each MED country. Trade costs are represented 
by tariffs, AVEs of NTMs, and transport and logistics costs. The idea is to test 
which of the three elements of trade costs are the most impeding to bilateral trade 
between MED countries and EU countries as well as amongst MED countries. The 
model shows that tariffs, NTMs,  and trade and logistics costs have a signif icant 
impact on trade, but is highly vivid  in countries suffering from high tariff rates, 
prevalence of NTMs, and trade costs. 
A number of simulations are carried out trying to differentiate between the im-
pact of partial liberalization and full liberalization on trade creation. The results 
obtained show that full liberalization has a significant effect whether it is only 
related to shallow integration (tariff removal) or deep integration (NTMs and trade 
and logistics). The effect is higher if trade costs and logistics are improved. The 
results are far less if only partial liberalization takes place and in several countries 
                                                 
1 MED countries include Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Le-
banon, Libya, Palestinian territories, and Israel. Libya and Palestinian territories have not 
been included in this analysis because of data unavailability. 
2 The term “Non Tariff Measures” (NTMs) has recently gained acceptance. It now tends to 
replace the term “Non Tariff Barriers” (NTBs) since some measures do not always intend 
to be explicitly protectionist (e.g. some regulations or standards designed at increasing 
consumer safety (Cadot et al. 2011). Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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is insignificant implying that marginal reductions in NTMs or tariffs cannot al-
ways help to create trade.  
Finally  the  study  shows  that  there  is  a  huge  potential  for  enhancing  trade 
amongst  MED  countries  if  trade  costs  are  lowered,  logistics  is  improved,  and 
NTMs are abolished. SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
 




The paper aims at assessing the specific impact of shallow versus deep integra-
tion between Mediterranean (MED) countries
3 and their partners in the European 
Union (EU) as well as between the MED countries themselves. It relies on dataset 
developed for this project concerning tariffs (as a proxy for shallow integration) 
and Non Tariff Measures (NTMs)
4 (as a proxy for deep integration). Additional 
data are also included in order to take into account other trade costs, especially 
transport costs and logistics costs. In this regard, an original dataset of maritime 
freight cost (Maersk, 2007) is introduced as well as the trade logistics performance 
(TLP) index produced by the World Bank. Such datasets are useful for providing 
additional insight into deep integration. 
The paper starts by calculating the magnitude of NTMs in terms of ad valorem 
tariff equivalent (AVEs). It relies on new research developments based on Kee et 
al. (2009). This makes it possible to get a first idea about the role of NTMs in 
Mediterranean trade and thus the cost of non -deep integration. The paper identi-
fied that despite different initiatives on the mult ilateral and regional levels the 
tariff levels remain relatively high in some MED countries as Tunisia and Algeria, 
and is lowest in Turkey and Israel. The estimation of NTMs through ad valorem 
equivalents (AVEs) shows that Algeria and Jordan have the highest value of 
AVEs, whereas Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt have the lowest value. When adding 
the tariffs and AVEs we observe that Algeria exhibit the highest level of prote c-
tion, followed by Tunisia, whereas Morocco has the lowest level of protection 
followed by Egypt. Lebanon and Jordan come in an intermediate position. 
In Part 1, the study estimated a gravity model based on a modified version of 
the theoretical equation developed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003 and 
2004), with special emphasis on trade costs which are the c rucial point in our re-
search study. Given the limitation of data on NTMs, the gravity model is estimated 
for only one year (2001), and for each MED country. Trade costs are represented 
by tariffs, AVEs of NTMs, and transport and logistics costs. The idea i s to test 
                                                 
3 MED countries include Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Le-
banon, Libya, Palestinian territories, and Israel. Libya and Palestinian territories have not 
been included in this analysis because of data unavailability. 
4 The term “Non Tariff Measures” (NTMs) has recently gained acceptance. It now tends to 
replace the term “Non Tariff Barriers” (NTBs) since some measures do not always intend 
to be explicitly protectionist (e.g. some regulations or standards designed at increasing 
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which of the three elements of trade costs are the most impeding to bilateral trade 
between MED countries and EU countries as well as amongst MED countries. 
This provides a better understanding about the expected gains due to these cost 
reductions in the framework of shallow and deep integration. The gravity model 
applies a Heckman two-stage procedure. Sensitivity analysis is carried out by using 
a number of other estimators (fixed-effects vector decomposition (FEVD), Hausman 
and Taylor, Feasable GLS) as well an alternative proxy for transport costs). Estima-
tions show that NTMs have a detrimental effect on trade in all MED countries. Al-
geria has the highest coefficient whereas Morocco has the lowest. Indeed, there is 
strong  correlation  between  the  magnitude  of  the  AVEs  and  the  trade  effects  of 
NTMs. NTMs significantly reduce bilateral trade in all Mediterranean countries. 
This means that whatever the past efforts of trade liberalization, both at multilateral 
and regional level, NTMs remain significant obstacles to trade. Transport coefficient 
is also significant showing that it acts as a major impediment to flow of trade if it is 
inefficient, yet the impact differs from one country to another with some countries 
not being affected as Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. The logistics coefficient is not al-
ways significant since it measures the impact of the EU partners logistics on flow of 
exports from MED countries, yet the logistics coefficient of MED countries is al-
ways significant implying that logistics affect negatively trade amongst MED coun-
tries. The gravity model results are robust after undertaking sensitivity analysis. 
A number of conclusions can be deducted from the gravity models' results in-
cluding: a) Trade costs significantly reduce imports to MED countries from their 
partners in the EU; Tariffs are import reducing, but mainly in the countries which 
showed the highest tariff levels (Algeria and Tunisia). This suggests that the shal-
low integration was not fully achieved in these countries. Despite further tariffs 
cuts since 2001, tariffs remain significant in these countries in the most recent 
years. As a result, significant gains can still be expected from shallow integration 
in these countries; c) NTMs are significantly trade-reducing in all countries, espe-
cially in Algeria. On the other hand, they are less trade-reducing in Morocco and 
Tunisia, though still significant. This means that eliminating NTMs in MED coun-
tries as a move towards deeper integration with the EU is expected to provide sig-
nificant gains; d) Transport costs significantly reduce trade, especially in Maghreb 
countries, since these countries show the highest freight costs. More generally, it 
seems that any improvement of logistics performance in MED countries is ex-
pected to increase  imports from their partners, since this contributes to reduce 
transport costs,  inefficiency  and  time.  As  a  result, any  deep integration policy 
which could stimulate the improvement of LPIs in MED countries (but also in the 
EU) is expected to provide additional gains. 
These results pave the way for simulations of trade creation due to shallow and 
deep integration which are carried out in Part 2 of the study. In Part 2, the study SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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tries to answer two main questions, namely what is the trade creation which can be 
expected for the completion of shallow integration between Mediterranean coun-
tries and their partners? This question is addressed by simulating the impact of 
tariff removal on trade flows; and is there additional trade creation if MED coun-
tries move to deep integration, including both NTM reduction and LPI improve-
ment? This is tackled not only by simulating the impact of reduction in NTMs but 
also transport costs and LPI. The simulations differentiate between shallow and 
deep integration and trade creation is calculated in both cases between the MED 
countries on the one hand and the EU countries on the other hand as well as 
amongst the MED countries. Each simulation considers an optimistic scenario Full 
integration) where full abolishment of tariffs, NTMs, and transport and LPI takes 
place, and a pessimistic scenario (partial integration) where only marginal cuts 
take place. Trade creation is high and significant for shallow and deep integration 
when full integration (optimistic scenario) takes place. However, it differs from 
one country to another being the highest in the case of Algeria, intermediate in the 
case of Tunisia and Egypt and smaller in the case of Morocco, Lebanon and Jor-
dan. Partial integration (pessimistic scenario) has a relatively insignificant impact 
on trade creation. However, the impact is much larger in the case of countries that 
had high tariff rates and AVEs of NTMs (namely Algeria and Tunisia), and less 
impact on countries that had relatively lower rates. The simulations also showed 
that trade gains due to deep integration can also been reinforced further through 
the improvement of logistics in MED countries. In the case of trade amongst MED 
countries, the optimistic scenario for deep integration shows very significant trade 
increases between the MED partners, both because of NTMs' removal and increase 
in  LPI.  Conversely,  the  shallow  integration  process  is  almost  fully  achieved 
through the GAFTA agreement. This is why trade increase is more limited. 
The main findings of the study are the following: 
1.  Tariffs are trade reducing, mainly in the countries which showed the 
highest tariff levels (Algeria and Tunisia). This suggests that the shallow 
integration was not fully achieved in these countries. 
2.  NTMs are significantly trade-reducing in all countries, especially in Al-
geria. On the other hand, they are less trade-reducing in Morocco and 
Tunisia, though significant. This means that eliminating NTMs in Medi-
terranean countries as a move toward deeper integration in the Euromed 
area is expected to provide significant gains. 
3.  Transport costs significantly reduce trade in Mediterranean countries, as 
well as inefficiencies in logistics. 
4.  The calculation of trade creation due to shallow and deep integration re-
veals that: Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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a.  Tariff removal is expected to produce moderate or limited gains, 
except in Algeria, and Tunisia (to a lesser extent), since both coun-
tries show higher tariffs than the other Mediterranean countries.  
b.  Elimination  of  NTMs is expected to  lead to  strong trade  gains 
(while a marginal reduction in NTMs leads to much smaller gains 
because NTMs must be importantly reduced in order to provide 
significant gains).  
c.  Trade gains due to deep integration can also been reinforced fur-
ther through the potential reduction in trade and logistics costs. 
These results lead to the following policy implications: 
5.  Mediterranean countries should complete their shallow integration with 
their EU partners and across themselves as a means of capturing the re-
maining trade gains available. In particular, Algeria should take efforts 
to reduce its tariffs which currently remain at high levels. 
6.  Dealing with deep integration is a more difficult task. First, NTMs must 
be addressed altogether, since we have shown that the removal of a par-
ticular NTM while keeping the other ones provides very limited bene-
fits. As a result, each Mediterranean country should identify precisely 
all NTMs for each product and decide whether to remove all NTMs for 
this product or not. Of course, the removal of all NTMs for all products 
is not necessarily the right solution, since some NTMs may be useful at 
product level for specific reasons (sanitary, etc.). 
7.  However, there are numerous NTMs in Mediterranean countries which 
strongly reduce trade. Some questions must be addressed with regard 
their removal for specific products, by eliminating para-tariff measures 
or moving towards mutual technical standard recognition. In any case, a 
cost-benefit analysis should be undertaken at product-level before em-
barking on NTMs elimination (especially in terms of short terms costs 
due to an increased competition with EU products). 
8.  A second aspect of deep integration relates to the efficiency of logistics. 
In this regard, significant additional gains can be achieved through the 
extension of the Euro-Mediterranean integration as a means of improv-
ing LPI (port infrastructures, logistics services, etc.). In this regard, an 
increased cooperation in infrastructure related projects is required. In 
addition, extending the financial cooperation between the EU and Medi-
terranean countries (through specific EIB loans) can also help improving 
logistics' performance. 
The study ends with an annex on the main NTMs prevailing in MED countries. SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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Introduction 
This paper aims at paving the way for assessing the specific impact of shallow 
versus deep integration
5 between Mediterranean (MED) countries
6 and their part-
ners in the European Union (EU) as well as between the MED countries the m-
selves. It relies on dataset developed for this project (Annex 3), concerning  espe-
cially  tariffs  (as  a  pro xy  for  shallow  integration)  and  Non  Tariff  Measures 
(NTMs)
7 (as a proxy for deep integration). Additional data are also included in 
order to take into account other trade costs, especially transport costs and logistics 
costs. In this regard, an original dataset of maritime freight cost (Maersk, 2007) as 
well as the logistics performance index (LPI) produced by the World Bank will be 
introduced.  Such datasets are  useful for providing additional insight into deep 
integration. 
Section 1 of Part 1 is dedicated to calculating the magnitude of NTMs in terms 
of ad valorem tariff equivalent (AVEs). It relies on new research developments 
based on Kee et al. (2009). This makes it possible to get a first idea about the role 
of NTMs in Mediterranean trade and thus the cost of non-deep integration. 
Section 2 of Part 1 estimates a gravity model from new theoretical and empiri-
cal developments. This model strongly relies on trade costs, following the liter a-
ture initiated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). Consequently, the  gravity 
model implemented makes it possible to calculate the specific impact of tariffs, 
NTMs and transport and logistics costs on trade of Mediterranean countries with 
their partners in the EU. This provides a better understanding about the expected 
gains due to these cost reductions in the framework of shallow and deep integr a-
tion. These results pave the way for simulations of trade creation due to shallow 
                                                 
5 This paper has been prepared  within the agenda of FP7-SSH-2009-A  funded project 
(Grant Agreement No. 244578) on “Prospective Analysis for the Mediterranean Region 
(MEDPRO)”, workpackage 5 on “Economic development, trade and investment”, Task 3 
on “Integration with the EU: Deep versus shallow integration”.  
6 MED countries include Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Syri a, Jordan, Turkey, Leba-
non, Libya, Palestinian territories, and Israel. Libya and Palestinian territories have not 
been included in this analysis because of data unavailability. 
7 The term “Non Tariff Measures” (NTMs) has recently gained acceptance. It now tends to 
replace the term “Non Tariff Barriers” (NTBs) since some measures do not always intend 
to be explicitly protectionist (e.g. some regulations or standards designed at increasing 
consumer safety (Cadot et al. 2011). Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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and deep integration which are carried out in Part 2 of the study. The simulations 
differentiate between shallow and deep integration and trade creation is calculated 
in both cases between the MED countries on the one hand and the EU countries on 
the other hand as well as amongst the MED countries. Conclusions and policy 
implications follow. SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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PART 1. PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE 





                                                 
8 By Nicolas Péridy. Université du Sud Toulon-Var. Faculté des sciences économiques. 
Avenue de l’Université, BP 20132, F-83957 La Garde Cedex ; Phone : +33 494 142 982 ; 
email : nicolas.peridy@univ-tln.fr. 
We are grateful to LailaMkimmer (Université du Sud) for research assistance. Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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Section 1: An Estimation of Tariff 
and NTMs Protection between 
MED-11 and the EU 
This section attempts to provide an estimation of trade costs, especially tariffs 
and NTMs applied between MED-11 and the EU (a review of the NTMs prevail-
ing in MED countries is provided in Annex 1). This will make it possible to i) 
have a better understanding of the level and magnitude of tariffs and NTMs in the 
countries considered; ii) use these estimations as inputs in the gravity model in 
order to assess the effects of tariffs and NTMs in the MED-11/EU trade. 
Starting with tariffs, where the database developed in this project (see Annex 3) 
provides bilateral tariffs at digit-2 level between MED countries and the EU. Fig-
ure 1 summarizes MFN tariffs applied by MED countries. 
 




























Note. Last year available in brackets. (Libya and Palestine are excluded due to lack of data). 
Source: Lopez Gonzalez and Mendez Parra, 2010. 
 
It shows that with the exception of Israel, Lebanon and Turkey, other countries 
still  show  significant  tariff  protection,  especially  Tunisia,  Egypt,  Morocco  and 
Algeria. SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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Table 1 complements these results by showing the average tariffs which are ef-
fectively applied overall and at the bilateral level. It provides a slightly different 
picture by showing that Israel and Turkey have removed almost all tariff protec-
tion with regard to EU imports. Morocco and Lebanon have also made significant 
progress, with small average tariffs applied to EU imports. On the other hand, 
Tunisia,  Syria  and  Algeria  show  the  highest  tariffs  (up  to  18%  for  Tunisia), 
whereas Jordan and Egypt are in intermediate position. It is however difficult to 
understand why Tunisia shows such a high level of tariffs with regards to EU im-
ports, since this country has signed an Association Agreement including a free 
trade area very early with the EU in 1995 and has started dismantling tariffs rela-
tively earlier than other South Mediterranean countries which signed with the EU 
similar agreements. Whatever the reliability of the data, Table 1 shows that the 
shallow integration process is not fully completed between MED countries and the 
EU, with the exception of Israel and Turkey. In particular, Algeria and Tunisia, to 
a lesser extent, exhibit relatively high tariffs. This remark will have significant 




Table 1. Average tariffs applied by MED countries on their imports (%, unweighted 
average) 
   Tariffs with all 
countris  Tariffs with EU  Share of Duty free 
EU lines 
Algeria (2009)  14.1  12.9  n.a. 
Morocco (2009)  8.2  3.9  51.0 
Tunisia (2006)  22.2  18.0  39.2 
Egypt (2008)  9.4  10.1  6.2 
Lebanon (2007)  5.1  5.4  n.a. 
Israel (2008)  2.1  0.1  95.0 
Jordan (2007)  10.1  11.0  38.3 
Syria (2002)  12.8  14.1  n.a. 
Turkey (2009)  1.2  0.1  n.a. 
Source: TRAINS; De Wulf and Maliszewska (eds.) (2009); n.a. non available. 
 
                                                 
9 It must be observed that MFN and applied tariffs are not strictly comparable, due to ag-
gregation biases. For example, TRAINS reports an applied tariff equal to 0 if there is no 
trade between Mediterranean countries and the EU for a given product. This of course 
introduces a bias since tariffs for this product are not necessarily equal to zero. As a result, 
this product must be removed if we wish to calculate average tariffs (weighted or un-
weighted) without this bias. Then, as products are aggregated into digit 2, MFN tariffs are 
not strictly comparable to applied one since the product coverage is not exactly the same. Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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With regards to the tariffs applied to MED countries’ exports by the partners 
considered in this study (i.e. all countries in the Euro-Mediterranean area), it must 
be reminded that they have been progressively removed both in the framework of 
the Barcelona process and in the framework of the South-South integration process 
(GAFTA agreement). As a result, the shallow integration is now completed with 
regard to MED countries’ exports. Algeria is one exception since this country is a 
GAFTA member but has not started the tariff liberalization process in 2005 (Péri-
dy and Ghoneim, 2009). Israel and Turkey are two other exceptions since these 
two countries are outside the GAFTA area. 
The estimation of NTMs is a more difficult task. As explained in Annex 3, the 
corresponding  data  come  from  the  TRAINS  database,  with  eight  groups  of 
measures,  including  specific  charges  and taxes,  administered  process, financial 
measures, automatic licenses, non automatic licenses and other quantitative re-
strictions, monopolistic measures as well as technical or quality regulations (for a 
complete description, refer to Annex 3). One drawback with this dataset is that 
data are incomplete and available for one year only (generally 1999 or 2001). 
Nevertheless, it provides a first insight into NTMs in MED countries. Another 
drawback is that the available data do not indicate the number of NTMs applied at 
the bilateral level. Consequently, it does not provide any direct indication about 
the effectiveness of NTMs as a protection tool. In particular, it is not possible to 
compare the magnitude of the protection due to NTMs to that due to tariffs since 
these two variables are not measured in the same way. However, this major prob-
lem can be solved by calculating tariff ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs. 
This can be achieved by using the recent methodology developed by Kee et al. 
(2009), which is sometimes referred to as KNO (2009). 
The KNO methodology can be applied here in two stages. The first includes an 
estimation of the quantity impact of NTMs on imports. Then, this impact is trans-
formed into price effects, using import demand elasticities calculated in Kee et al. 
(2008). 
In the first stage, the basic equation to be estimated is the following: 
 
 
  , , , , , , , log( ) log 1
k ntb
n c n n k c n c n c n c n c n c
k
m C ntm t             ,  (1.1) 
 
where mn,c is the import value of good (or industry) n in country c (MED coun-
tries) from EU countries (i), C
k
c denotes a vector of country characteristics varia-SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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bles in MED countries. They include relative factor endowment
10 and the sum of 
GDP (of the reporter and the partner country) which captures economic size. The 
geographic distance between MED countries and their Mediterranean partners is 
also included. ntmn,c is a dummy variable which reflects the existence of bilateral 
NTMs. tn,cis the bilateral tariff on good n in country c (for imports from the EU) 
and n,c corresponds to the import demand elasticity.  
Using  the  dataset  completed  by  Lopez  Gonzalez  and  Mendez  Parra  (2010) 
(Annex 3), several proxies are available for tariffs, namely MFN, PREF (preferen-
tial) and AHS (effectively applied tariffs), which is the minimum between MFN 
and PREF. As a sensitivity analysis, all proxies have been tested. However, since 
preferential tariff data are often unavailable
11, this introduces two problems. The 
first is that it significantly increases the number of unavailable observations. Sec-
ondly, it introduces a bias in AHS measure. As a matter of fact, the measure of 
AHS will be correct when the preferential tariff is available, but when it is not, the 
AHS tariff takes the value of the MFN one (si nce in the formula, the minimum 
between MFN and unavailable PREF becomes MFN). Consequently, the measure 
of the AHS is very volatile in time since it sometimes captures MFN only. Given 
these problems, the MFN tariff seems to be the most reliable measure fo r the cal-
culation of AVEs. Therefore, the results presented later include only MFN tariffs. 
In the same way, several proxies are available for NTMs. As noticed earlier, 
eight groups of measures are available. For simplicity, we aggregate all these 
NTM types (except the first category which includes tariffs). In addition, a distinc-
tion is also made according to the products and/or countries the NTM applies to. 
Indeed, some NTMs apply regardless of the origin (e.g. sanitary requirement), 
some others regardless of the product whereas some others are product-specific or 
country-specific. In order to capture the full range of NTMs, the latter have also 
been aggregated, including country and product-specific NTMs as well as country 
and product non-specific NTMs. As a final step, this NTM variable is transformed 
into a binary variable which takes the value of zero in case of no NTM and unity if 
there are at least one NTM. This transformation is necessary to fit the model d e-
scribed in equation (1.1).
12 However, when testing the trade impact of NTMs in 
section 3, we will not use any longer a dummy variable. 
                                                 
10 Factor endowment is measured by a proxy which is the difference in GDP per capita 
between the reporter and the partner country. As a sensitivity analysis, calculations have 
also been implemented with the proxy developed by Antweiler and Trefler (2002), but the 
results are less relevant in this case. 
11 This may be because of zero flows or because data are unavailable for a given product in 
a given country. 
12 Some other proxies have also been tested as a sensitivity analysis. The first is a variable 
which only include product and country-specific NTMs, given that when NTMs apply to Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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The initial model is subsequently modified as follows. First, import-demand 
elasticities estimated in Kee et al. (2008) are substituted into (1.1). Second, the 
tariff term is moved to the left-hand side to address the endogeneity of tariffs. This 
introduces a new error term kn,c. Third, a White correction is introduced in order to 
tackle heterosckedasticity of the error term. Fourth, product specific effects are 
also introduced so as to capture the variation of s across tariff lines. Fifth, appro-
priate instrumental variables are included to address the endogeneity problem re-
lated to NTMs. Indeed, as shown in Lee and Swagel (1997), such endogeneity 
may lead to a downward bias for the estimated impact of NTMs on imports, which 
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The  left  hand  side  of  this  equation  reflects  the  value  of  imports  once  tariffs 
have been taken into account. This value of imports depends on country character-
istics as well as on the remaining barriers to trade, i.e. NTMs.  
Estimating equation (1.2) with the two-step Heckman procedure (TSHP) relies 
on the following assumption. The basic idea is that zero trade flows in the dataset 
do not occur randomly but are the outcome of a selection pr ocedure. As a result, 
the TSHP estimator makes it possible to correct for this selection bias. The first 
stage estimates a Probit model (test for the pro bability of country i to exports to 
country j). In a second stage, when exports occur, the effects of t rade barriers and 
other  variables  can  be  estimated  through  the  choice  of  an  appropriate  estimator 
(Heckman, 1979, Greene, 2006).  
Basically, various selection variables have been tested. The final specific ation 
assumes  that  the  likelihood  to  export  depends  on  the  type  of  partner  countries. 
Indeed, the partner countries are classified into four groups according to the prob-
ability  to  export,  which  depends  notably  on  political  barriers.  The  four  groups 
include the EU-15, other Mediterranean partners, other EU countries, and Israel. It 
is  expected  that  the  probability  for  Med iterranean  countries  to  export  is  greater 
                                                                                                                           
all products and countries, there is no discrimination any longer across products and coun-
tries. As a second proxy, we use the total number of NTMs applying for each product and 
each country.  
13 For additional details, refer to Kee et al. (2009) p.177. SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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towards  the  EU-15  than  towards  other  countries,  especially  Israel  for  political 
reasons. As a sensitivity analysis, it is assumed that the probability to export de-
pends on the occurrence of exports in the past period. Indeed, according to the new 
trade theory developed by Baldwin and Krugman (1989), a firm must bear sunk 
costs before entering the export market. As a result, a firm’s probability to export 
depends on its ability to export in the past period. This theory is based on hystere-
sis in international trade. 
The last step consists of calculating the AVEs after the transformation of the 










,  (1.3) 
 
where Pd denotes the domestic price. This equation defines AVEs as the effects of 
NTMs on prices. The introduction of the price variable is necessary since, like ad-
valorem tariffs, NTM effects must be calculated on prices and not on quantities. 

















   (1.4) 
 
Results are presented in Table 2 and Figure 2 (except for Israel, Turkey and 
Syria  for  which  data  on  NTMs  are  unavailable).  The  estimation  of  the  TSHP 
shows that the presence of NTMs (i.e. when the NTM dummy is equal to unity) 
has a negative and significant impact on the dependent variable (imports nets of 
tariffs)  in  Mediterranean  countries.  However,  there  are  significant  differences 
across countries. As a matter of fact, Algeria is the country which faces the greater 
coefficient related to NTMs (-0.83). Conversely, Morocco and Tunisia exhibit the 
lowest coefficient in absolute value (-0.33 and -0.38 respectively). Lebanon, Jor-
dan and Egypt are ranked in an intermediate position
14. 
                                                 
14At this stage, it is worth noting that the reliability of the calculation of these coefficients 
is limited by the restricted quality of the data concerning NTMs. As a matter of fact, results 
can be sensitive to the way the NTMs are measured. The final specification presents aver-
age results, where all NTMs are taken into account (country-specific, product-specific as 
well as NTMs applied to products regardless of their origin). Results are also limited by 
the restricted availability of the data for NTMs (only available for the year 1999 or 2001 
and even non available for Turkey and Israel) or for trade and tariffs at product level. Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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Looking at the other independent variables, the GDP per capita ratio is positive 
and generally significant. This means that as the economic distance (measured by 
the gap in GDP per capita) increases between Mediterranean countries and their 
partners, trade also increases. This also suggests that most trade patterns between 
Mediterranean countries and their partners involve inter-industry trade. The sum of 
GDP between Mediterranean countries and their partners also show a positive and 
significant sign, as expected theoretically. Indeed, trade is expected to increase 
with the size of the two partners. Interestingly, the sign of the selection variable is 
negative and significant. This means that the likelihood to trade depends on the 
type of partner countries (EU, other Mediterranean countries or Israel). 
 
Table 2. Parameter estimates used for the calculation of AVEs (from the two-step 
Heckman Procedure (TSHP)) 
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-1.59  -1.78  -1.16  -1.26  -1.45  -1.24 
Note. Dependent variable: imports net of tariffs (see equation 1.2). *** significant at 1%-
level; ** significant at 5%-level; * significant at 10%-level. 
Source: own calculations. Import demand elasticities from Kee et al. (2008). 
 
The results presented in Table 2 are used to calculate AVEs according to equa-
tion (1.4). The lower the parameter estimate corresponding to NTMs and the lower 
the import demand elasticity (in absolute value), the higher the AVE. The other 
variables are not directly introduced for the calculation of the AVE but they are 
necessary in the model in order to make sure that the NTM parameter estimate is 
not biased by omitted variables. 
The calculations of the corresponding AVEs are reported in Figure 2. They 
provide a first picture about the magnitude of NTMs. In this regard, it can be ob-
served that protection due to NTMs is very significant for Algeria but also for SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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Jordan (due to low import demand elasticity in  absolute value)
15. In these two 
countries, NTMs amount to more than 33% in tariff equivalent. It is striking to 
observe that these countries also show the highest number of NTMs in the dat a-
base, up to 309,800 for Jordan). Conversely, Morocco, Tunisia but also Egypt (due 
to high import demand elasticity in absolute value) exhibit the lowest AVEs (less 
than 25%). Interestingly, these countries show the lowest number of NTMs in the 
database (about 20000 each). 
 














Morocco  Egypt Tunisia  Lebanon Jordan Algeria 
 
Source: own calculation. 
 
Summing tariffs and NTMs, the overall protection is presented in Figure 3. It is 
worth mentioning that all Mediterranean countries exhibit NTMs which are greater 
than tariffs. Overall, Algeria, and Jordan but also Tunisia (due to significant tar-
iffs) show protection levels which range between 43% (Jordan) and 50% (Alge-
ria). In the other countries, protection is also significant, but to a lesser extent 
(about 30% in Morocco, Egypt and Lebanon). Of course, adding tariffs and NTMs 
together provide levels of protection which are not fully reliable, as a quota might 
be binding and hence no tariff-equivalent effect will be shown. In other words, the 
impact is not necessarily in additive manner. Nevertheless, Figure 3 provides an 
illustrative picture of overall protection in Mediterranean countries. 
In brief, whatever the method implemented and the quality of the data used for 
the calculation, it seems that the overall rate of protection remains significant in 
                                                 
15 The import demand elasticity is equal to -1.16 in Jordan whereas it is -1.78 for Egypt. 
This explains that although these two countries exhibit similar parameter estimates, the 
AVE is greater for Jordan according to equation (1.4). Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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Mediterranean countries, especially due to great NTMs. This has been confirmed 
by a recent World Bank report on MENA countries which identified that NTMs 
remain a significant barrier to enhancing trade in general and exports in specific in 
this region (World Bank, 2011b). 
 








Morocco  Egypt Lebanon Jordan Tunisia  Algeria 
tarifs NTMs (AVEs)
 
Source: own calculation. 
 
Given these high protection levels, it is expected that the trade impact of both 
tariffs and NTMs is significant on Mediterranean imports from their partners. The 
story is somehow different when looking at Mediterranean exports to their part-
ners. In this regard, it must be observed that the EU has fully removed its tariff 
protection applied to these countries since the early 90s. In addition, the NTMs 
applied by the EU also seem to be of lower importance. For example, Kee et al. 
(2009) shows that the AVE applied by the EU to its imports is equal to 13.4%. 
This is much lower that AVEs applied by Mediterranean countries to their own 
imports.  Consequently,  the  NTM  removal  between  the  EU  and  Mediterranean 
countries is expected to produce smaller effects with regard to Mediterranean ex-
ports than Mediterranean imports from the EU. This question will be investigated 
in the following section. 
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Section 2: The Application of a 




i. Theoretical underpinning 
 
The following gravity model can be implemented in order to provide a first 
glimpse about the impact of shallow versus deep integration. From a theoretical 
point of view, the gravity equation has been considerably renewed in recent years. 
Indeed, it has been increasingly recognized that this equation can be derived from 
various international trade theories, notably Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin and mo-
nopolistic competition models (Helpman and Krugman 1985, Bergstrand 1989, 
Markusen  and  Wigle  1990,  Evenett  and Keller  2002),  but  also  the  reciprocal-
dumping model (Feenstra, Markusen and Rose, 2001). 
The gravity equation proposed here is based on this renewal. It starts from a 
modified version of the theoretical equation developed by Anderson and van Win-
coop (2003 and 2004), with special emphasis on trade costs which are the crucial 
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,  (1.5) 
 
Xijt corresponds to country i’s exports to country j at year t. The first term in brack-
ets includes the mass variables, namely country i’s GDP (Yit), country j’s GDP (Yjt) 
as well as world GDP (Ywt). The second term in brackets reflects trade costs. They 
include the bilateral trade cost (Tijt) as well as implicit prices (Pit and Pjt) which 
measure multilateral trade costs (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). 
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16 See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for the complete derivation of the model. Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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  1 11 , it jt jt ijt
j
P P t i
  
    ,  (1.7) 
 
with θi and θj denoting country i and j's income shares. 
Since prices depend on the trade barriers applied to all countries, they reflect 
multilateral trade resistance, i.e. the trade barriers that an exporter faces with all 
importing countries, not only its bilateral partner j. As a result, a rise in the trade 
costs vis-à-vis all its partners leads country i to trade more with its bilateral partner j. 
 
 
ii. Model specification, data and sources 
 
This theoretical framework makes it possible to derive the following empirical 
equation which will be tested for the Mediterranean countries’ trade relationships: 
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  (1.8) 
 
Given that data for NTMs are only available for one year (generally 2001), the 
gravity equation will only be estimated for this year. This is why the temporal 
pattern of the equation is disregarded. In addition, the equation is estimated for 
each Mediterranean country i. As a result, the equation does not include the GDP 
of  the  origin  and  destination  country  separately,  but  the  sum  of  the  GDP 
(SUMGDP)  of each  Mediterranean  country  with its  partner  j
17.  This  particular 
specification is frequently used both in the theoretical and the empirical literature 
based on the new trade theory (NTT) (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Finally, 
subscript k denotes the product decomposition level (digit 2). 
Interestingly, bilateral trade costs are considered with three variables. The first 
corresponds to bilateral tariffs (TARj). This variable will be used as a proxy for the 
shallow integration whose process has been initiated in the Barcelona process and 
its related Association Agreements. As in section 1, the MFN tariffs have been 
used for the estimation of the model, given the possible biases related to the use of 
the AHS tariffs. Data are derived from the UNCTAD TRAINS database (see An-
nex 3 for complete description of these variables). 
                                                 
17 As in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), world GDP is passed on to the intercept . SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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NTMs will be considered as a proxy for deep integration. We will use the same 
proxy as in section 1, i.e. a binary variable which takes the value of unity in case 
of NTMs and 0 otherwise.  
TRANSCOST is an original measure of transportation costs. It is based on sta-
tistics developed by Maersk, which is one of the leading liner shipping companies 
in the world. It must also be reminded that maritime transport accounts for about 
80% of world trade. The variable used in the model corresponds to the freight 
costs in US dollar for a standard container (20 foot long) from a port of origin to a 
port of destination (year 2007). Table 3 shows some freight costs for a selection of 
importing (mport) and exporting (xport) ports 
 
Table 3. Freight costs for a selection of countries in the Euro-Mediterranean area  
(US dollar for a standard container, 2007) 
mport  xport  Freight  mport  xport  freight 
Algeria  France  1872.62  Morocco  France  1431.07 
Algeria  Germany  1914.56  Morocco  Germany  1439.73 
Algeria  Italy  1709.09  Morocco  Italy  1515.20 
Algeria  Netherlands  1858.30  Morocco  Netherlands  1350.19 
Algeria  Spain  1940.52  Morocco  Spain  1265.98 
Algeria  UK  1906.98  Morocco  UK  1552.95 
Egypt  France  1574.17  Tunisia  France  1394.65 
Egypt  Germany  1216.68  Tunisia  Germany  1436.59 
Egypt  Italy  859.46  Tunisia  Italy  879.65 
Egypt  Netherlands  1160.43  Tunisia  Netherlands  1252.19 
Egypt  Spain  1409.07  Tunisia  Spain  1296.13 
Egypt  UK  1348.61  Tunisia  UK  1464.54 
Israel  France  1639.68  Turkey  France  1521.23 
Israel  Germany  1281.62  Turkey  Germany  1363.46 
Israel  Italy  1277.46  Turkey  Italy  1473.55 
Israel  Netherlands  1225.37  Turkey  Netherlands  1307.20 
Israel  Spain  1430.59  Turkey  Spain  1422.70 
Israel  UK  1273.00  Turkey  UK  1442.40 
Source: Maersk Line (2007).  
 
Since data are not available for all reporter and partner countries, missing data 
have been simulated from the following panel data model: 
 
 
0 ln ln ij i j ij ijt TRANSCOST DIST           .  (1.9) 
 
In equation (1.9), the relationship between freight costs (TRANSCOST) and 
distance is estimated with available data. A fixed-effects model is implemented Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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with i and j as country-specific effects. Results show that a0=1292.8 and =0.071 
which is significant at 5% level. 
In a second step, freight costs can be simulated for the missing importing or 
exporting countries by the use of the estimated results (including the estimated 
fixed effects). 
As a sensitivity analysis, alternative variables are also used for transport costs. 
The most interesting one is related to the logistics performance index (LPI) (World 
Bank, 2011a). This indicator is built from information gathered in a worldwide 
survey of the companies involved in logistics services. Seven areas are covered by 
this index, namely: efficiency of the clearance process by customs and other bor-
der agencies, quality of transport and information technology infrastructure for 
logistics, ease of arranging international shipments, competence of the local logis-
tics industry, ability to trace and check international shipments, domestic logistics 
costs  as  well  as timeliness  of  shipments  in  reaching  destination. The  LPI  is a 
weighted average of these variables. It ranges between 1 (worst) to 5 (best). Over-
all,  the  LPI  is  particularly  relevant  for  our  study  since  it  measures  not  only 
transport costs, but more generally the efficiency of logistics in a given country. It 
is expected that countries with the best LPI score trade more than other countries 
(everything being equal). 
Figures 4a and 4b show respectively the score and country ranking of for the 
countries included in the present study. The most striking feature is the gap be-
tween the EU and MENA countries. As a matter of fact, 11 EU countries are 
ranked in the world top-20 countries. In particular, Germany, Sweden and the 
Netherlands are respectively ranked at the first, second and fourth place in the 
world for their logistics performance (Singapore is at the second place). These 
three EU countries are major global transport and logistics hubs which are very 
efficient. These countries are followed by most Northern EU countries. On the 
other hand, MED countries are ranked well behind, except Israel, Lebanon and 
Turkey (ranked 31, 33 and 39 respectively) which are close to Southern and East-
ern EU countries. 
In particular, Algeria and Libya are placed at the bottom of the country ranking 
(respectively 130 and 132). This reveals major inefficiency problems for transport 
and logistics in these two countries. Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco also show 
poor results in terms of LPI. However, Tunisia, ranking 61 shows significant pro-
gress. In this regard, the World Bank (2007) noted that the difference in country 
ranking between Tunisia and Morocco may be explained by the fact that Tunisia 
has implemented the core reforms earlier than Morocco and has just reaped the 
benefits of these reforms. Nevertheless, Morocco has recently implemented exem-
plary customs and port reforms which should significantly improve its ranking in SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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the coming years. It must also be noticed that data for 2010 are unavailable for 
Morocco. 
 










































































































































































































































































Note. *year 2007 concerning Morocco. 
Source: World Bank (2011a). 
 












































































































































































































































































Note. *year 2007 concerning Morocco. 
Source: World Bank (2011a). Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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Although the LPI is a very interesting indicator, its relevance for the present 
study is limited by the fact that data are provided at country level, not at bilateral 
level. In addition, since the estimation of the model is implemented for each MED 
country, it is not possible to test the impact of each MED country’s logistics effi-
ciency on their imports. Given this limitation, two alternative solutions are pro-
posed. The first consists in testing the impact of partner’s LPI on MENA coun-
tries’ imports. In this case, the estimation results will reflect to what extend logis-
tics efficiency of MED’s partners (mainly EU countries) increases the imports 
from these partners. A second possibility consists in testing the LPI impact on all 
(not each) MED countries’ exports, in order to increase the number of available 
observations. 
As a last alternative proxy for transport costs, the distance between MED coun-
tries and their EU partners will also be used. It is measured by a weighted index 
which takes into account the spatial distribution of the population within each 
country (CEPII, 2007a). 
LANGij is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a common language 
is spoken by at least 10% of the population in each country pair (exporter and im-
porter) and 0 otherwise (source: CEPII, 2007b). 
COLij reflects colonial relationships over a long period of time with substantial 
participation in the colonized country’s governance (CEPII, 2007b). This variable 
is equal to 1 in case of colonial links and 0 otherwise. This variable accounts for 
cultural and historical relationships which are expected to increase trade flows 
between some EU countries and Mediterranean countries. 
Finally, specific country and product effects are introduced in the model (j and 
k). These effects make it possible to capture the heterogeneity of the data. They 
also capture the effects of potential omitted variables (Egger, 2004). In particular, 
the price effects included in equation (1.5) are captured by the country-specific 
effect(j)
18.In addition, the product effect  k takes into account potential omitted 
variables at product level. All these specific effects can be considered as fixed or 
random depending on the specification of the model. 
 
 
                                                 
18 As there are no reliable cross-country price indicators, the use of the country-specific 
effects is the most commonly used in the empirical literature since Anderson and van Win-
coop (2003). SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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iii. Choice of the estimators and sensitivity analysis 
 
The estimation of equation (1.8) requires specific econometric analysis in order 
to address several potential biases. The first bias to be considered is heterogeneity 
across countries and products. It requires the use of fixed-effects (FE) or random 
effects (RE) estimators. However, the problem with standard FE models is that 
they cannot estimate parameters which are product invariant, such as freight costs, 
language and colonization in equation (1.9). On the other hand, standard RE model 
may be biased because of endogeneity problems due to the potential correlation 
between one or several independent variables and the residuals. 
One recent and interesting estimator can be used for addressing these problems. 
This is  the fixed-effects vector decomposition (FEVD) estimator developed by 
Plümper and Troeger (2007). This three stage fixed-effects model can estimate the 
parameters of the product invariant variables while addressing the endogeneity 
problem. Basically, the first stage estimates a pure fixed effects model to obtain an 
estimate of the unit effects. The second step implements an instrumental regres-
sion of the fixed effects vector on the product invariant variables. This makes it 
possible to decompose the fixed effects vector into a first component explained by 
the product-invariant variables and a second component, namely the unexplainable 
part (the error term). In the last stage, the model is re-estimated by pooled OLS, 
including all explanatory variables, the product-invariant variables and the error 
term. This third step ensures the control for collinearity between product-varying 
and invariant right hand side variables.  
As a sensitivity analysis, another estimator corrected for endogeneity is pre-
sented.  It  is  based  on  a  random-effects  estimator  with  instrumental  variables, 
namely the Hausman and Taylor (HT) estimator, described in Egger (2004).  
An additional potential bias is due to zero observations. This problem is poten-
tially important since the database includes bilateral and disaggregated trade flows 
(by industries at digit-2). This problem can be addressed by several alternative 
methods. The first consists of transforming all trade values in non zero flows, as 
follows: 
 
  ) 1 ln( ln
'   jk jk X X .  (1.10) 
 
This method is commonly used in the empirical literature. However, it does not 
specifically address the question of why some firms export while some others 
don’t (selection bias). A second possible estimator is the Poisson Pseudo Maxi-
mum  Likelihood  (PPML)  (Santos  Silva  and  Tenreyro,  2006).  This  estimator 
makes is possible to simultaneously solve the bias due to missing zero flows and Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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heteroskedasticity. However, it does not address the selection bias due to zero 
observations. 
A third interesting method is the Two-Stage Heckman Procedure (TSHP). As 
shown previously, the basic idea is that zero trade flows in the dataset do not occur 
randomly but are the outcome of a selection procedure. As a result, the TSHP es-
timator provides a correction for this selection bias. The first stage estimates a 
Probit model (test for the probability of country i to exports to country j). In a se-
cond stage, provided that exports occur, the effects of trade barriers and other vari-
ables can be estimated though the choice of an appropriate estimator (Heckman, 
1979, Greene, 2006). This method seems particularly interesting in the present 
research study because it specifically takes into account the information contained 
in the zero or missing data, which are potentially numerous in case of econometric 
modelling at disaggregated product data level.  
The main problem is to choose the appropriate selection variable. Recent re-
search at firm level (Melitz, 2003) suggests that in case of different productivity 
levels between firms, the existence of fixed costs produces a selection of the firms. 
As a result, only the most productive ones succeed in exporting whereas the others 
remain in the domestic market. This suggests that productivity at firm level can be 
used as the selection variable in this kind of model. Unfortunately, in the present 
research, data are not available at firm level so that this selection variable cannot 
be implemented.  
However, as already explained in section 1, it can also be considered that polit-
ical problems between countries also influence the decision of firms to export. 
Consequently, it will be assumed that Mediterranean countries are more likely to 
trade with traditional partners (EU-15) whereas the probability to export will be 
low with Israel, for political reasons. As a sensitivity analysis, the lagged export 
variable will also be used as the selection variable. As already explained in section 
1, this can be justified by considering hysteresis in international trade (Baldwin 
and Krugman, 1989).  
Finally, as an additional sensitivity analysis, the estimators are also controlled 
for cross-sectional heteroskedascticity as well as serial correlation of the error term 
by using appropriate Feasable GLS. 
 
 
iv. Estimation and results 
 
Equation  (1.8)  is  estimated  for  the  imports  of the nine  MED  countries  de-
scribed above. However, data for Syria proved to be of poor quality so that this SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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country has eventually been removed. As already mentioned, the estimation is 
implemented at the year for which NTMs are available (generally 1999 or 2001). 
The partner countries include the whole Euromed area (i.e. the EU-15, Central and 
Eastern EU countries (CEECs) as well as the eight Mediterranean countries de-
scribed above, after Syria is excluded, besides Libya and Palestine, due to the lack 
of data in the trade, transport and other databases). Thus, 33 partner countries are 
included. The dataset also includes a product decomposition level at digit-2. 
Estimations are presented in Table 4 for the Heckman two-stage procedure. 
Table 5 provides a sensitivity analysis by showing alternative estimators (Fixed-
effects  vector  decomposition,  Hausman  and Taylor,  Feasable  GLS)  as  well an 
alternative proxy for transport costs, i.e. distance. 
Table  4  clearly  shows that  NTMs  have  a  detrimental effect  on  trade  in  all 
Mediterranean countries. As a matter of fact, all parameter estimates are signifi-
cant at the 1% level. Interestingly, Algeria exhibits the highest coefficient in abso-
lute value (-0.694). Jordan and Egypt show intermediate levels for the parameter 
estimates (about -0.5) whereas Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon present the lowest 
coefficients (from -0.31 to 0.38). These results can be compared to those corre-
sponding to AVEs (Figure 2). Indeed, there is generally a correlation between the 
magnitude of the AVEs and the trade effects of NTMs. As a matter of fact, Algeria 
shows the highest AVE and the greatest trade impact of NTMs. Conversely, Mo-
rocco and Tunisia exhibit the lowest AVEs and the smaller trade impact of NTMs. 
To  sum  up,  NTMs  significantly  reduce  bilateral  trade  in  all  Mediterranean 
countries. This means that whatever the past efforts of trade liberalization, both at 
multilateral and regional level, NTMs remain significant obstacles to trade. How-
ever, this impact differs depending on the country considered, i.e. with a more 
detrimental impact in the case of Algeria and a less detrimental impact for Moroc-
co and Tunisia. This reflects pretty well the difference in the openness of these 
countries. 
It must also be noticed that it is the existence of NTMs which is trade-reducing, 
given that NTMs are measured as a dummy variable. As a sensitivity analysis, the 
model has been estimated by using another proxy which includes the number of 
NTMs  for  each  product.  Results,  although  significant,  are  less  relevant.  This 
means that a marginal increase in the number of NTMs (let us say from 19 to 20 
NTMs in a given product) has much less trade-reducing effects than when we 
move from no NTM to the existence of NTMs (which is captured by the dummy 
variable). Additional discussion will be provided in Part 2 when simulating the 
effects of NTM reduction or elimination. 
Table 4 also shows that tariffs reduce trade significantly in Algeria and Tunisia. 
Again, this result can be related to the fact that these two countries exhibit the Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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highest tariff protection levels in 2001. On the other hand, Lebanon presents the 
lowest coefficient (-0.055). Turkey, Jordan, Morocco and Israel also show a low 
coefficient.  
At this stage, it must be noticed that the differences in the magnitude of the pa-
rameter estimates related to tariffs and NTMs cannot be strictly compared, since 
both variables are not measured identically. In other words, the fact the tariff coef-
ficient is lower than the NTM one in Algeria does not necessarily mean that tariffs 
are more trade-reducing than NTMs since tariffs are measured ad-valorem and 
NTMs are measured as a dummy variable which takes the value of 0 in case of no 
NTMs and 1 in case of the presence of at least one NTM. This question will be 
fully addressed in Part 2 when comparing together the trade impact of all trade 
costs (tariffs, NTMs and transport costs). 
The transport coefficient also provides interesting information in Tables 4 and 
5. In this regard, it must be observed that all countries show a negative coefficient. 
This coefficient is significant for all countries except Egypt, and possibly Israel 
and Jordan (refer to sensitivity analysis in Table 5). By and large, this result sug-
gests that transport costs are generally trade reducing in the Euromed area (EU 15, 
other EU countries and Mediterranean countries).   
Turkey and Maghreb countries exhibit the largest effects contrary to Mashrek 
countries, which show lower or even insignificant effects. This result can be main-
ly explained by the fact that average freight costs are lower in Egypt and Israel 
than in Maghreb countries. As a matter of fact, Table 6 shows the unweighted 
average of freight costs for each Mediterranean country towards 6 EU countries 
(France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK). Interestingly, Egypt 
and Israel show the lowest trade costs, i.e. below 1300 US$ for each container. 
Conversely, Maghreb countries and Turkey have the highest freight costs to the 
EU (up to 1867 US$ in Algeria). This means that it is more costly to ship goods 
from Maghreb countries to Europe than from Mashrek. This result may appear as 
counterintuitive at first sight since Maghreb countries are closer to Europe than 
Mashrek countries. However, transport costs do not depend only on distance be-
tween two countries but also on many other factors, such as port efficiency. In any 
case, the fact that Egypt and Israel show lower transport costs than Maghreb coun-
tries is helpful to explain why the negative impact of transport costs on trade is 
smaller in Mashrek countries
19.  
                                                 
19Results should be interpreted cautiously for some countries where transport costs are not 
directly available, like Jordan. In this case, the coefficient can be biased. For this country, 
the sensitivity analysis implemented in Table 5 provides significant and negative results by 
using distance instead of the estimated transport costs. SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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Interestingly, estimation parameters for partner’s LPI are always positive but 
significant only for Turkey and Israel. However, the relevance of this variable is 
limited by the fact that it does not test the impact of logistics efficiency in each 
MENA country considered, but rather the impact of partners’ LPI. Since most 
partner countries are EU countries and since there are no major significant differ-
ences in LPI across EU countries, it is not so surprising that the parameter esti-
mates are not always significant.  
More interestingly, the estimation of MED countries’ LPI is positive and sig-
nificant
20. This suggests that any improvement of logistics in MED countries is 
expected to increase trade with their partners, especially because this improvement 
will contribute to reducing transport cost, inefficiency and time. As a matter of 
fact, 1% decrease in LPI makes it possible to increase MED countries imports by 
1.95%. An extension to MED cou ntries’ exports show that 1% decrease in LPI 
leads to an export increase by 2.96% 
The other variables are generally significant while showing the expected sign. 
For example, the size of the market (measured by the sum of GDPs) is always 
positive and significant. This shows that trade always increase with the market size 
of the origin and destination countries. The existence of past colonial links is also 
trade creating, especially for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The variable corre-
sponding to common language is also significant in Morocco, Tunisia as well as 
Jordan and Lebanon
21. 
Overall, the robustness of these results is checked by the sensitivity analysis 
presented in Table 5. It is striking to observe that the parameter estimates related 
to NTMs and tariffs are fairly stable whatever the estimator applied. The transport 
coefficient is also stable, except for some countries for which direct data are un a-
vailable (Jordan and Lebanon). This is why the parameter estimates calculated 
with transport costs must be cross-checked with those calculated with distance. 
At the stage of the analysis, the overall conclusions are the following (these re-
sults must still be interpreted cautiously since they sometimes rely on old data, 
especially NTMs): 
1.  Trade  costs  significantly  reduce  imports  to  Mediterranean  countries 
from their partners in the EU. 
                                                 
20 It must be reminded that the corresponding parameter estimate has been calculated for 
all MED countries taken together as a means of increasing the number of observations.  
21With regard to Turkey, it must be observed that there is no colonial li nk and no common 
language with other countries in the EU. This explains the lack of parameter estimates 
corresponding to these variables. Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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2.  Tariffs are import reducing, but mainly in the countries which showed 
the highest tariff levels (Algeria and Tunisia). This suggests that the 
shallow integration was not fully achieved in these countries. Despite 
further tariffs cuts since 2001, tariffs remain significant in these coun-
tries in the most recent years. As a result, significant gains can still be 
expected from shallow integration in these countries. 
3.  NTMs are significantly trade-reducing in all countries, especially in Al-
geria. On the other hand, they are less trade-reducing in Morocco and 
Tunisia, though still significant. This means that eliminating NTMs in 
Mediterranean countries as a move towards deeper integration with the 
EU is expected to provide significant gains. 
4.  Transport costs significantly reduce trade, especially in Maghreb coun-
tries, since these countries show the highest freight costs (Figure 5). 
More generally, it seems that any improvement of logistics performance 
in MED countries is expected to increase imports from their partners, 
since this contributes to reduce transport costs, inefficiency and time. As 
a  result,  any  deep  integration  policy  which  could  stimulate  the  im-
provement of LPIs in MED countries (but also in the EU) is expected to 
provide additional gains 
 












Egypt Israel Tunisia Turkey Morocco Algeria
 
Source: calculations from Source: Maersk Line (2007). 
 
5.  A similar analysis for MED country exports shows that tariffs have no 
impact, since the MED countries’ partners inside the Euromed area have 
removed  their  tariffs.  However,  it  seems  reasonable  to  believe  that SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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NTMs applied by the EU has an impact on MED countries exports, alt-
hough this impact is limited by the fact that the AVE applied by the EU 
is lower than that applied by MED countries. Finally, it seems that the 
most important impact may be found in logistics since we have shown 
that MED countries’ exports are significantly reduced by their low LPI. 
In this regard, any improvement of logistics in MED countries should 
significantly increase their exports towards the EU. 
These results pave the way for additional research left in Part 2 of this study. 
The main questions which will be investigated will be the following: 
  What is the trade creation which can be expected for the completion of 
shallow integration between Mediterranean countries and their part-
ners? This question will be addressed by simulating the impact of tar-
iff removal on trade flows. 
  Is there additional trade creation if Mediterranean countries move to 
deep  integration,  including  both  NTM  reduction  and  LPI  improve-
ment? This will be tackled not only by simulating the impact of reduc-
tion in NTMs but also transport costs and LPI. 
These questions will be investigated in Part 2 by appropriate trade modeling 
which takes into account the results already obtained. 
 
Table 4. Estimation Results: the impact of tariffs, NTMs, transports and other 
variables on MED countries' imports 
Heckman 
Twostep  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Leba-
non 
Moroc-








































**  0.045  - 
common 




***  0.209  - 
constant  17.409
**  1.345
***  -0.488  8.032
***  1.543
***  6.979














nb obs.  1544  1655  1533  1984  1820  1944  1937  2740 
censored 
obs  68  451  172  203  328  275  395  722 
Source: own estimation. 
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Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis (imports' determinants using alternative variables and 
estimators) 
   Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Leba-
non 
Moroc-
co  Tunisia  Israel  Turkey 
Heckman Twostep 
distance  -0.606




***  -0.074  -0.741
*** 
partner's 
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PART 2: INTEGRATION WITH THE 
EU AND WITHIN THE REGION: 
SIMULATIONS OF SCENARIOS OF 




                                                 
22 By Nicolas Péridy Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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Section 3: Shallow Versus Deep 
Integration: Definition of the 
Scenarios 
According to the trade modeling developed in Part 1 and given the data availa-
ble, Table 6 shows the various simulations and scenarios which will be imple-
mented. In each case, we will distinguish between a partial move towards shallow 
and deep integration (pessimistic scenario), and full integration (optimistic scenar-
io).  
 
Table 6. Simulations used for Shallow and Deep Integration 








simistic)    Full 
(Optimistic)   
Tariffs  Tariffs  NTMs  LPI  NTMs  LPI 
Marginal cut  Complete 




Source: own proposal. 
 
As stated previously, the tariff liberalization process in Mediterranean countries 
is not completed (see Table 1 in Part 1). As a matter of fact, the latest data available 
show that MFN tariffs range from 6% (Israel) to 32% (Tunisia). In the same way, 
applied tariffs (i.e. including preferential tariffs) range from 1.2% (Turkey) to 18% 
(Tunisia). Consequently, the simulations for shallow integration will consider the 
marginal effect of tariff reductions as the pessimistic scenario (partial liberalization) 
as well as their complete removal as the optimistic scenario (full liberalization). 
Deep integration includes two tools. The first is NTMs. As mentioned previ-
ously, NTMs are still highly significant in Mediterranean countries according to 
the dataset used. Indeed, Figure 2 shows that the tariff equivalent of NTMs can be 
scaled from 22.1% (Morocco and Egypt) to 35.6% (Algeria). Again, two types of 
simulations can be performed: marginal effects in the reduction of NTMs and a 
complete removal (pessimistic and optimistic scenarios). SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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In addition, transport costs or more generally logistics inefficiencies can also be 
considered as trade barriers, although they are not product-specific. In this regard, 
it has been shown previously that the average transport costs differ greatly across 
Mediterranean countries (from less than 1300 US dollars for Egypt and Israel to 
almost 1900 US dollars for Algeria concerning imports from EU countries). In 
addition, the average freight costs faced by Mediterranean countries which import 
from Europe is 1436 US dollars. This is much greater than the average costs corre-
sponding to EU countries’ imports (1235 dollars). This difference amounts to 15% 
(Table 7). This means that transport costs not only depend on oil prices, but also 
on many other variables which can have trade-reducing effects. These are espe-
cially port efficiency (port infrastructure and services), scale economies, market 
structures (competition for trade routes) as well as directional traffic imbalance 
(Figueiredo, 2010). This means that a reduction in these trade-related costs can be 
viewed as a further step toward deep integration in Mediterranean countries.  
Given that LPI is a wider concept than transport costs, it will be used as the 
reference variable for the scenarios. In the simulations, the pessimistic scenario 
will be built up on the assumption of a marginal increase in LPI whereas in the 
optimistic scenario, it will be assumed that LPI improves to the level reached in 
middle income countries, such as Mexico, Argentina and Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries (i.e. 3.05). This level also corresponds to the case where coun-
tries reach the 66% of highest performers (World Bank, 2011a). 
 
Table 7. A comparison of freight costs between EU countries and Mediterranean 
countries (in US dollars, average costs, 2007) 
Mediterranean Average  1436 
Egypt  1261 
Israel  1287 
Tunisia  1354 
Turkey  1422 
Morocco  1426 
Algeria  1867 
Europe Average  1235 
Netherlands  1109 
Spain  1129 
Germany  1213 
UK  1286 
France  1462 
Source: own calculations from Maersk (2007). 
 
Before presenting the results of these simulations, the methodology implement-
ed for them must be carefully described which is undertaken in Section 4. Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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Section 4: The Implementation of 
the Simulations: Calculating Trade 
Creation Effect of Shallow Versus 
Deep Integration 
In this section, we distinguish partial integration and full integration from a 
methodological  viewpoint.  As  mentioned  previously,  partial  integration  can  be 
captured by the marginal effects shown directly by the parameter estimates corre-
sponding to tariffs, NTMs and LPI. Simulation can thus be derived directly from 
Tables 4 and 5, since the model has been estimated on a log-log basis. In this case, 
the parameter estimates show directly the effects of a 1% decrease in trade costs 
on trade in Mediterranean countries
23. These marginal effects will be reported in 
the next section as the trade creation due to partial shallow or deep integration 
(pessimistic scenario). 
One the other hand, full integration cannot be grasped by the marginal e ffects, 
since it corresponds to a 100% reduction in trade costs (except logistics) or at least 
to a very significant reduction, i.e. towards levels reached in middle income coun-
tries. Consequently, a specific methodology must be implemented in order to cap-
ture the full effects of tariffs and NTMs removal. The methodology proposed here 
has been commonly used in the literature for the calculation of trade creation due 
to regional integration from a standard dummy variable (refer for instance to Péri-
dy, 2005). This methodology is refined here by considering specific variables cor-
responding to tariffs and NTMs. 
Basically, the gross trade creation due to the full removal of tariffs (shallow in-
tegration) or NTMs (deep integration) is defined by replacing equation (1.8) by: 
 
                                                 
23 The only change which must be made is the replacement of the binary variable corre-
sponding to NTMs by a variable which shows the number of NTMs. The corresponding 
parameter shows the percentage change in trade due to the 1% reduction in the number of 
NTMs. SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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3 ln ln jk jk ijk X HX NTMs   ,  (2.1b) 
 
where lnHXjk reflects the hypothetical exports to Mediterranean countries, assum-
ing no tariff (equation 2.1a) or no NTM (equation 2.1b). Indeed, lnHXjk is equal to: 
 
 
0 1 3 4
56
ln ln ln ln
ln ln
jk j jk j
j j j k ijt
HX SUMGDP NTM TRANSCOST
LANG COL
   
    
    
    





0 1 2 4
56
ln ln ln ln
ln ln
jk j jk j
j j j k ijt
HX SUMGDP TAR TRANSCOST
LANG COL
   
    
    
    
.  (2.2b) 
 
On the other hand, the specific effects of tariffs and NTMs are captured by the 
TAR and NTM variables in the right hand side of equations (2.1a) and (2.1b).These 
variables must be defined as dummies which take the value of unity in case of no 
tariff (or NTMs) and zero otherwise (in log terms). Defined like this, these varia-
bles show the impact of the presence or the absence of tariff (NTMs) and will be 
used for simulating the impact of full integration versus the current situation. 
Indeed, the gross trade creation due to the removal of tariffs and NTMs can 




jk jk G X HX  .  (2.3) 
 
Replacing HXjk from equation (2.3) into equations (2.1a) and (2.1b) and giving 
TARjk  and  NTMjk  the  value  corresponding  to  full  integration  (lnTARjk=1  and 
lnNTMjk=1), it comes: 
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,  (2.5a) 
   









,  (2.5b) 
 
in case of full deep integration (NTM removal). In equations 2.5a and 2.5b, the 
term in brackets corresponds to the trade creation as a percentage of observed ex-
ports. It ranges from 0 to 1, i.e. from 0% to 100%. It equals zero when there is no 
trade effects of tariffs (or NTMs). In this case, 2(3) is insignificant. Conversely, 
as  increases towards infinity, the gross trade creation increases exponentially 
towards 100%. 
The model can also be solved in order to calculate simultaneously the impact of 
shallow and deep integration. In this case, it is easy to show that the gross trade 









,  (2.6) 
 
Please note that the trade creation is not an additive function. This means that 
the gross trade creation calculated separately for tariffs and NTMs in equations 
2.5a and 2.5b do not add together to that calculated simultaneously in equation 
2.6. This is due the mathematical properties of the trade creation function.  
With regard to LPI, as already mentioned, it is expected that MED countries 
reached the level of middle-income country. The parameter estimate is that used in 
Tables 4 and 5. 
 
Tables 8 and 9 exhibit the estimation results and the sensitivity analysis of the 
gravity  model  specially  estimated  for  the  simulations.  The  sensitivity  analysis 
provides  estimation  results  using  alternative  estimators  and/or  alternative  inde-
pendent variables (e.g. LPI instead of transport costs). As already mentioned, this 
model requires some changes in the measurement of the tariffs and the NTM vari-
ables. The econometric methodology is the same as that used previously. It thus 
presents the Heckman two-step procedure as the main estimator. In addition, a 
sensitivity analysis is included through the use of alternative estimators, i.e. the SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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FEVD, the Hausman and Taylor as well as the FGLS. As expected, results are 
very close to those already found previously, but the parameter estimates corre-
sponding to tariffs and NTMs are more appropriate for the simulations which will 
be presented and discussed in the following section
24. 
 
Table 8. Parameter estimates used for full liberalization (dependent variables: MED 
countries’ imports) 
Heckman 
Twostep  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Leba-
non 
Moroc-
co  Tunisia  Israel  Turkey 
independent: 






***  -  - 
no tariffs  0.848
**  0.490  0.071  0.072  0.281  0.564
*  0.001  0.029 
transport  -3.100

















*  0.079  0.296
***  0.830
***  0.900
***  0.077  - 
common 




***  0.310  - 
constant  19.041
**  -3.939  -0.449  8.260
***  1.555
***  8.933














nb obs.  1560  1657  1606  1984  1820  1959  2232  2930 
Censored 



















Fixed-effects vector decomposition ( FEVD, product-invariant and endogeneity) 






**  -  - 
no tariffs  0.867
**  0.424  0.101  0.081  0.410  0.512  0.001  0.023 
transport  -3.099













***  -  - 
no tariffs  0.919
*  0.424  0.101  0.082  0.411  0.512  0.001  0.023 
transport  -3.221






                                                 
24 Please note that the parameters corresponding to tariffs and NTMs are positive in Table 
2. This is expected since these parameters are calculated as dummies which take the value 
of zero in case of positive tariffs (or NTMs) and 1 otherwise. These dummies will be used 
for the calculation of trade creation following equation 2.5a and 2.5b. Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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Heckman 
Twostep  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Leba-
non 
Moroc-
co  Tunisia  Israel  Turkey 
FGLS (panel heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation) 






**  -  - 
no tariffs  0.810
*  0.418  0.070  0.080  0.187  0.556  0.001  0.045 
transport  -2.917






Source: own estimation. 
 
Table 9. Parameter estimates used for partial liberalization (marginal effects) 
(dependent variable: MED countries’ imports) 
Heckman 
Twostep  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Leba-
non 
Moroc-




*  0.01  -0.046
***  -0.0033
*  -0.014




























**  0.118  0.295
***  0.833
***  0.802
**  0.045  - 
Common 




***  0.209  - 
Constant  17.162
**  -2.612  -0.111  8.228
***  1.081
***  6.992
**  1.057  8.789
** 
selection: 










nb obs.  1544  1655  1533  1984  1820  1944  1937  2740 
Censored 

















Fixed-effects vector decomposition ( FEVD, product-invariant and endogeneity) 
NTMs  -0.115
*** -0.023
***  0.01  -0.046
***  -0.0033
*  -0.014




















*  0.01  -0.047
***  -0.009
**  -0.014

















FGLS (panel heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation) 
NTMs  -0.115
***  -0.012
*  0.01  -0.048
***  -0.0033
*  -0.014
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Section 5: Estimation Results: The 
Calculation of Trade Creation 
Effects of Shallow and Deep 
Integration 
Using the parameters corresponding to tariffs, NTMs and transport costs in Ta-
ble 8, this section will first present the trade creation effects due to full integration 
corresponding to shallow and deep integration (optimistic scenario). Thereafter, it 
will also present the marginal effects expected from partial integration (pessimistic 
scenario), using parameters from Table 9. 
 
 
i. Trade creation due to shallow and deep integration (full removal of 
tariffs and NTMs): the optimistic scenario 
 
Table 10 and Figure 6 show the results of trade creation as a percentage of 
Mediterranean imports corresponding to equations 2.5a, 2.5b and 2.6. For each 
country, three columns are presented first. They correspond to the trade creation 
due to the removal of tariffs, NTMs and both, respectively. As already explained 
previously, the trade creation due to tariffs and NTMs cannot be strictly added. 
This is why the trade creation presented in the last column is not equal to the sum 
of that calculated in the first two columns. When the parameter estimates corre-
sponding to tariffs are statistically insignificant, we assume that trade creation due 
to shallow integration (tariff removal) is also insignificant. In this case, the overall 
effect is the same as that corresponding to the removal of NTMs (deep integra-
tion). Besides, a fourth column is introduced to take into account additional trade 
creation due to improvement of logistics. In the optimistic scenario, it is assumed 
that MED countries improve their LPI toward the 66% of highest performers, i.e. 
an LPI index equal to 3.05. This level is recorded in several middle-income coun-
tries, such as Mexico, Argentina, Chile as well as some Central and Eastern EU 
countries. Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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In addition, three lines are presented for each country. They reflect the mini-
mum, maximum and average trade creation. These are calculated from Table 8 by 
taking respectively the lowest, highest and average parameter estimates amongst 
the four available estimators (Heckman two-step, FEVD, Hausman and Taylor as 
well as FGLS). This makes it possible to define margins of errors in the calcula-
tion of trade creation. In this regard, it can be observed that this margin is general-
ly very thin. This is an indication about the fair robustness of the econometric re-
sults. Concerning the column related to LPI, the minimum and maximum are cal-
culated by taking -10% or +10% from the average scenario. 
A first crucial result is that trade creation due to deep integration (removal 
of NTMs) is very significant in all countries. In particular, the trade creation for 
Algeria amounts to 60.4% of its current imports (we remind that the maximum is 
100%). Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon also exhibit high potentials of import increases 
if they remove their NTMs (from 32% in Lebanon to 39% in Egypt). Tunisia and 
Morocco show the lowest trade creation (about 25%), although this percentage is 
still very significant. 
Overall, these results can interestingly be related to the calculation of AVEs 
and the results of the gravity model presented in Tables 2 and 4. Indeed, it has 
been shown that the most trade-reducing impact of NTMs concerned Algeria and 
the smaller impact involved Morocco and Tunisia. Hence, the results for trade 
creation strongly correlate with our previous conclusions. However, these results 
go further since they make it possible to quantify and scale from 0% to 100% the 
specific impact of deep integration (NTM reduction). In particular, it shows that 
this impact is very huge for Algeria. 
These results are also consistent with those found in De Wulf and Maliszewska 
(2009) which state that deep integration could lead to significant trade gains. 
The gains due to deep integration can also be increased by logistics improve-
ment. As a matter of fact, Table 10a and Figure 6a show that these gains are very 
significant for Algeria (+57%). This is due to the fact that this country faces a very 
poor logistics performance (the LPI is currently equal to 2.36). Consequently, an 
improvement towards middle income countries’ LPI (3.05) would lead to very 
significant import increases. Significant trade gains are also expected for Morocco 
(44%). However, it must be reminded that this gain is based on LPI data from 
2007 and does not take into account the efforts of the Moroccan authorities to 
increase their logistics performance in the very recent years. As a result, the gain 
expected in Table 10a may be overestimated compared to the other countries for 
which LPI data are updated. Egypt and Jordan also show significant effects ex-
pected from logistics improvement (increase in imports by 32% and 21% respec-
tively), whereas gains for Tunisia are smaller (14%) since this country is already SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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close to the LPI level equal to 3.05. No gain is expected for Turkey, Israel and 
Lebanon, which have already outpassed this LPI level. 
To sum up, deep integration is expected to lead to significant import increases 
in MED countries, both because of removal of NTMs and logistics' improvement. 
This result is in line with World Bank (2011b) which identified that market access 
for EC countries' exports remains a major problem, which is mainly due to high 
prevalence of NTMs. 
 
Table 10a. Percentage change in Mediterranean countries’ imports (optimistic 
scenario) ( from significant parameter estimates only)  
    Tariffs  NTMs  Both  TPI 
Algeria 
Min  57.2%  59.6%  82.7%  51.2% 
Max  60.1%  61.2%  84.5%  62.6% 
average  58.6%  60.4%  83.6%  56.9% 
Egypt 
Min  ns  38.4%  38.4%  29.5% 
Max  ns  40.0%  40.0%  36.1% 
average  ns  39.2%  39.2%  32.8% 
Jordan 
Min  ns  38.7%  38.7%  18.9% 
Max  ns  40.2%  40.2%  23.1% 
average  ns  39.4%  39.4%  21.0% 
Lebanon 
Min  ns  31.8%  31.8%  0.0% 
Max  ns  33.0%  33.0%  0.0% 
average  ns  32.4%  32.4%  0.0% 
Tunisia 
Min  ns  24.3%  24.3%  12.3% 
Max  43.1%  28.9%  59.5%  15.1% 
average  21.5%  26.6%  41.9%  13.7% 
Morocco 
Min  ns  23.0%  23.0%  39.7% 
Max  ns  24.5%  24.5%  48.5% 
average  ns  23.8%  23.8%  44.1% 
Israel 
Min  ns  -  -  0.0% 
Max  ns  -  -  0.0% 
average  ns  -  -  0.0% 
Turkey 
Min  ns  -  -  0.0% 
Max  ns  -  -  0.0% 
average  ns  -  -  0.0% 
Note. ns –  insignificant parameter estimate. 
Source: own estimation. 
 
A second interesting result is related to shallow integration, through tariff re-
moval. In this regard, the trade creation is very significant for Algeria, i.e. 59%. 
Again, there is a strong correlation between this result and the fact that Algeria 
still applies very high tariffs, as shown in Section 1 Results for Tunisia are very 
sensitive to the estimator used in Table 8. As a matter of fact, Tunisia is a country Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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which still showed significant tariffs, but to a lesser extent than Algeria. As a re-
sult, the parameter estimates are not always significant. This is why the calculation 
of trade creation exhibits a minimum of 0% (this corresponds to insignificant pa-
rameters in Part 1) and the maximum is 43% (for the highest significant parame-
ters). For the other countries, parameter estimates related to tariffs show the ex-
pected sign, but are insignificant. This suggests that the complete tariff removal is 
not expected to add a significant trade creation. This is an expected result since we 
showed that these countries have already strongly reduced their tariff protection 
(Part 1). As a result, no significant additional trade creation is expected. However, 
these results do not say that marginal effects of further reduction in tariffs are in-
significant, as will be shown in sub-section b). 
 
Figure 6a. Percentage change in Mediterranean countries’ imports (optimistic 
















Source: own estimation. 
 
In other words, tariffs do not have such a significant effect when compared to 
NTMs because parameter estimates are often insignificant. This reflects the fact 
that tariffs have been reduced in most MED countries, except mainly in Algeria. 
Finally, the combination of both tariffs and NTMs’ removal provides an overall 
trade creation which is huge for Algeria (83%), intermediate for Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon as well as Tunisia (from 32% to 42%) and smaller for Morocco (24%). 
Again, these results reflect pretty well the overall liberalization level reached by 
Mediterranean countries. This will have important policy implications, as devel-
oped later. 
At this stage, it must however be noticed that we considered that positive, but 
statistically insignificant parameters corresponding to tariffs lead to insignificant SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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trade effects. However, the results are affected by the threshold below which pa-
rameter become statistically insignificant. 
In Table 8 for example, the parameter corresponding to tariffs is statistically 
significant down to 0.564 (Tunisia) but becomes statistically insignificant below 
this threshold. In the case of Egypt the value of the parameter is 0.490 (below the 
threshold). Consequently, we assumed above that trade creation due to tariff re-
moval is insignificant for Egypt, even if the parameter estimate is not equal to 
zero. 
Table 10b and Figure 6b provide the results by using the value of all parameter 
estimates, even if they are not significant. This has the advantage of solving the 
problem of the threshold significance. On the other hand, the drawback is that we 
consider that a trade creation can be positive even if the corresponding parameter 
estimate is insignificant. 
 
Table 10b. Percentage change in Mediterranean countries’ imports (optimistic 
scenario) (from all parameter estimates) 
    Tariffs  NTMs  Both  TPI 
Algeria 
Min  57.2%  59.6%  82.7%  51.2% 
Max  60.1%  61.2%  84.5%  62.6% 
average  58.6%  60.4%  83.6%  56.9% 
Egypt 
Min  33.9%  38.4%  59.3%  29.5% 
Max  38.7%  40.0%  63.2%  36.1% 
average  36.3%  39.2%  61.3%  32.8% 
Tunisia 
Min  40.1%  24.3%  54.7%  12.3% 
Max  43.1%  28.9%  59.5%  15.1% 
average  41.6%  26.6%  57.1%  13.7% 
Jordan 
Min  6.8%  38.7%  42.8%  18.9% 
Max  9.6%  40.2%  45.9%  23.1% 
average  8.2%  39.4%  44.4%  21.0% 
Morocco 
Min  17.1%  23.0%  36.2%  39.7% 
Max  33.7%  24.5%  49.9%  48.5% 
average  25.4%  23.8%  43.1%  44.1% 
Lebanon 
Min  6.9%  31.8%  36.5%  0.0% 
Max  7.9%  33.0%  38.3%  0.0% 
average  7.4%  32.4%  37.4%  0.0% 
Israel 
Min  0.1%  -  -  0.0% 
Max  0.1%  -  -  0.0% 
average  0.1%  -  -  0.0% 
Turkey 
Min  2.3%  -  -  0.0% 
Max  4.4%  -  -  0.0% 
average  0.1%  -  -  0.0% 
Source: own estimation. 
 Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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Figure 6b. Percentage change in Mediterranean countries’ imports (optimistic 

















Source: own estimation. 
 
The results are slightly different to those presented in Table 10a and Figure 6a 
since shallow integration provides positive gains not only for Algeria and Tunisia, 
but also for Egypt and Morocco (which are slightly below the statistically signifi-
cant threshold). However, results for Jordan, Lebanon as well as Israel and Turkey 
are similar to the previous ones with very small gains. Again, the country distribu-
tion of trade gains due to shallow integration is closely linked to the tariff levels 
applied by the countries concerned. This means that the gains are higher for coun-
tries like Algeria and Tunisia which show the highest tariff levels. 
Results for deep integration are identical as those presented above since all the 
corresponding parameter estimates are significant. Overall, trade creation due to 
shallow and deep integration is very high for Algeria. It is intermediate for Tunisia 
and Egypt and smaller for Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan. 
A last set of results can be provided concerning MED countries’ exports. Fig-
ure 7 summarizes the export increases expected from shallow and deep integra-
tion. As expected, tariffs have no impact on MED countries’ exports since the EU 
has already removed its tariffs applied to the exports of the MED countries. This 
means that the shallow integration is already completed on the EU side. The ex-
port increases due to the removal of NTMs in the EU are significant (18.5%) but 
limited by the fact that the AVE in the EU (13.4%) is much lower than the AVEs 
in MED countries, as shown previously. This suggests that the removal of NTMs 
in MED countries and in the EU is expected to lead to a more important increase SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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in MED countries’ imports than exports
25. However, considerable export increase 
is expected from the improvement of MED countries LPI t oward middle-income 
countries level. In this regard, the export effects shown in Figure  7 and Table 11 
are greater that the import effects calculated previously, because the parameter 
estimate corresponding to LPI is equal to 2.96 for exports and only 1.95 for i m-
ports. In other words, the logistics improvement in MED countries should help 
them increase their exports more than their imports. 
 
Figure 7. Percentage change in Mediterranean countries’ exports (optimistic 

















Source: own estimation 
Table 11. Percentage change in Med Exports optimistic scenario (average from all 
parameter estimates) 
  Tariffs  NTMs  TPI 
Algeria  0%  19%  86% 
Morocco  0%  19%  67% 
Egypt  0%  19%  50% 
Jordan  0%  19%  33% 
Tunisia  0%  19%  21% 
Lebanon  0%  19%  0% 
                                                 
25 Due to a lack of data concerning NTBs in all EU countries, we rely on the AVE calcu-
lated by Kee et al. (2009).  Moreover, the export increase has been estimated assuming that 
trade effects for a given AVE is the same for all countries. For example, since the AVE in 
the EU is roughly half of the AVE calculated for MENA countries, it is expected that trade 
effects for EU imports are half of that calculated for EU exports. Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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ii. Marginal effects of shallow and deep integration (partial integra-
tion): The pessimistic scenario 
 
Table 12 shows the marginal effects of shallow and deep integration, directly 
based on the parameter estimates derived in Section 4. It provides the percentage 
effects on exports to Mediterranean countries due to i) a 1% tariff cut; ii) a 1% 
reduction in the number of NTMs and iii) a 1% increase in LPI. In this regard, the 
magnitude of the parameters corresponding to tariffs, NTMs and LPI are not strict-
ly comparable across themselves, since the measurement of these variables is not 
similar (percentage for tariffs, numbers for NTMs and value index for LPI). In 
addition, the results cannot be strictly compared to those presented in sub-section 
a), not only because the methodology is different, but also because the proxy vari-
ables for tariffs and NTMs are also different, due to methodological requirement. 
However, Tables 10 and 12 provide complementary results. 
 
Table 12. The pessimistic scenario:  Percentage change in trade due to: 1% reduction 
in tariffs rates, 1% reduction in the number of NTMs and 1% increase in LPI) 
 
MENA countries' imports  MENA countries' exports 
Tarifs  NTMs  LPI  Tarifs  NTMs  LPI 
Algeria 
Min  1.06  0.12  1.75  0.00  0.06  2.66 
Max  1.08  0.12  2.05  0.00  0.06  2.26 
Average  1.07  0.12  1.95  0.00  0.06  2.96 
Egypt 
Min  0.67  0.01  1.75  0.00  0.01  2.66 
Max  0.68  0.02  2.05  0.00  0.01  3.26 
Average  0.68  0.02  1.95  0.00  0.01  2.96 
Jordan 
Min  0.24  0.01  1.75  0.00  0.01  2.66 
Max  0.26  0.01  2.05  0.00  0.01  3.26 
Average  0.25  0.01  1.95  0.00  0.01  2.96 
Lebanon 
Min  0.06  0.05  1.75  0.00  0.03  2.66 
Max  0.06  0.05  2.05  0.00  0.02  3.26 
Average  0.06  0.05  1.95  0.00  0.02  2.96 
Tunisia 
Min  0.87  0.01  1.75  0.00  0.01  2.66 
Max  0.92  0.01  2.05  0.00  0.01  3.26 
Average  0.90  0.01  1.95  0.00  0.01  2.96 
Morocco 
Min  0.29  0.01  1.75  0.00  0.01  2.66 
Max  0.30  0.01  2.05  0.00  0.01  3.26 
Average  0.30  0.01  1.95  0.00  0.01  2.96 
Israel 
Min  0.04  -  1.75  0.00  -  2.66 
Max  0.05  -  2.05  0.00  -  3.26 
Average  0.05  -  1.95  0.00  -  2.96 
Turkey 
Min  0.03  -  1.75  0.00  -  2.66 
Max  0.04  -  2.05  0.00  -  3.26 
Average  0.04  -  1.95  0.00  -  2.96 SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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Source: own estimation. 
 
First, a 1% reduction in the number of NTMs does not increase trade very much 
(the maximum increase is 0.12% for Algeria and the minimum is insignificant for 
Jordan). This result does not contradict the one developed in sub-section a). It only 
suggests that a marginal (1%) reduction in the number of NTMs (for example from 
20 to 19.8 barriers) does not strongly improve trade. This means that trade is less 
sensitive to the intensity of NTMs than to their existence. In other words, a signifi-
cant trade creation is expected to occur provided that a significant amount of NTMs 
are removed whatever their initial number. Having said that, the country-scaling 
shown in Table 12 is consistent with that found previously. Indeed, the greatest ef-
fects are found for Algeria whereas the smallest ones involve Morocco, Tunisia (and 
Jordan). Again, this result will have strong policy implications. 
As a second result, a 1% tariff reduction on MED countries’ imports has signif-
icant effects for Algeria, and Tunisia to a lesser extent, since it increases imports 
by 1.06% and 0.9% respectively. This is not surprising since these countries have 
the highest tariff levels. A moderate impact is expected for Egypt (0.68%) as well 
as Morocco, and Jordan to a lesser extent (about 0.3%). Conversely, these effects 
are less important in the other countries, especially Israel, Turkey and Lebanon 
(0.06%). These results can be compared to those found in sub-section a). In fact, 
the country scaling is very similar. Besides, as already mentioned, no gain is ex-
pected for MED countries exports, since the EU has already removed its tariffs for 
imports from MED countries. 
Finally, trade gains due to deep integration can also been reinforced further 
through the improvement of logistics in MED countries. As already mentioned, 
since the parameter estimates is greater for exports than for imports, MED coun-
tries are expected to increase their exports more than their imports due to logistics 
improvements. 
 
 Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 96  58 
Section 6: The Case of South-
South Integration 
This section provides specific insights into integration between MED countries. 
For that purpose, the model is estimated from a restricted country sample, which 
only includes MED countries as reporters and partner countries. This makes it 
possible to appraise the impact of tariffs, NTMs and transport costs within the 
MED countries’ area. As has been shown in Part 1, tariffs across MED countries 
have been phased out during the GAFTA integration process (except Algeria). 
Consequently, all tariffs have been eliminated since 2005. However, some recent 
surveys indicate that the previous tariff protection has sometimes been replaced by 
additional NTM for specific products (Péridy and Ghoneim, 2009). As a result, 
trade liberalization across MED countries is still not yet fully completed. 
Figure 8 and Table 13 provides the simulation results due to full liberalization 
with regard to MED countries’ imports. Since bilateral tariffs across MED coun-
tries have been removed since 2005, there is no effect of tariffs on trade
26. There 
are however three exceptions: the first is Algeria which has joined the  GATFA 
area but has not started removing its tariffs in 2005. The other exceptions concern 
Israel and Turkey which are outside the GAFTA area. 
The results concerning trade effects of NTMs are similar to those found in Sec-
tion 5. For example, in the case of full liberalization, all MED countries show a sig-
nificant impact of NTMs' reduction. In the same way, as in Se ction 5 and for the 
same reasons, NTMs' limited reductions provide smaller marginal gains because as 
already discussed, marginal cuts in NTMs are not enough to increase trade.  
In addition, improvement in LPI leads to significant import increases, especial-
ly in Algeria due to its poor logistics performance. As in section 5, the import ef-
fects for Morocco may be over-estimated because estimation is based on data from 
2007. This means that the recent improvement in LPI is not taken into account in 
                                                 
26 Preliminary results which use MFN tariffs as an independent variable show that although 
bilateral tariffs have been removed across MED countries, MFN tariffs are still import-
reducing in some countries which are GAFTA members. This unexpected result can be 
explained by the fact that the MFN tariff variable may capture some non tariff protection. 
However, for consistency of the estimations, we used the zero tariff for all countries except 
Algeria, Turkey and Israel. SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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the simulations. The same applies to Egypt which has undertaken significant logis-
tics' improvement at the ports, though might be less than Morocco. 
Results concerning exports clearly indicate that in case of full liberalization, the 
removal  of  NTMs  provides  significant  export  increases,  generally  about  35% 
(Figure 9 and Table 14). This means that MED countries can take advantage of the 
NTMs' removal across themselves in order to increase their exports. Interestingly, 
Algeria shows smaller gains, because the other MED countries apply lower NTMs 
than Algeria. This means that the remaining export potential is a bit smaller for 
Algeria, i.e. less than 30%. 
 
















Source: own estimation. 
 
Table 13. Percentage change in Med region imports (optimistic scenario) 
  Tariffs  NTB  TPI 
Algeria  71%  62%  45% 
Tunisia  22%  44%  10% 
Jordan  0%  34%  17% 
Egypt  0%  28%  26% 
Lebanon  0%  27%  0% 
Morocco  0%  30%  35% 
Israel*  2%  0%  0% 
Turkey*  3%  0%  0% 
Source: own estimation. 
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Source: own estimation. 
Table 14. Percentage change in Med region exports (optimistic scenario) 
  Tariffs  NTB  TPI 
Algeria  3%  28%  69% 
Tunisia  8%  38%  16% 
Jordan  11%  38%  26% 
Egypt  11%  38%  40% 
Lebanon  11%  38%  0% 
Morocco  11%  38%  54% 
Source: own estimation. 
 
These gains must be added to those corresponding to LPI improvement. Given 
the high export elasticity corresponding to LPI (2.39), the export increases are 
particularly significant, especially for the countries which show the lowest logis-
tics performance. As a matter of fact, the expected export increase is equal to 
about 70% for Algeria, 50% for Morocco and 40% for Egypt.  
To sum up, the optimistic scenario for deep integration shows very significant 
trade increases between the MED partners, both because of NTMs' removal and 
increase  in  LPI.  Conversely,  the  shallow  integration  process  is  almost  fully 
achieved through the GAFTA agreement. This is why trade increase is more lim-
ited. With regard to imports, only Algeria is expected to enjoy significant import 
increases,  since  this  country  has  not  applied  the  GAFTA  agreement.  Tunisia 
shows more limited gains, whereas in the other countries, no import increases are 
expected since their have already removed all tariffs on imports originating from 
the GAFTA area. Turning to exports, gains are also limited. Most countries are SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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expected to increase their export by about 10%. This is due to the effects of the 
expected tariff liberalization in Algeria. 
Turning to the pessimistic scenario (Table 14), marginal effects of both tariffs 
and NTMs' reduction are limited, as in the previous section. However, LPI im-
provement is expected to provide significant gains for most of the countries.  
 
Table 14. The pessimistic scenario:  Percentage change in trade due to: 1% reduction 
in tariffs rates, 1% reduction in the number of NTMs and 1% increase in LPI) 
 
MENA countries' imports  MENA countries' exports 
Tarifs  NTMs  LPI  Tarifs  NTMs  LPI 
Algeria 
min  1.05  0.06  1.40  0.01  0.01  2.15 
max  1.10  0.06  1.70  0.01  0.01  2.63 
average  1.08  0.06  1.55  0.01  0.03  2.39 
Egypt 
min  0.00  0.02  1.40  0.00  0.01  2.15 
max  0.00  0.03  1.70  0.00  0.01  2.63 
average  0.00  0.03  1.55  0.02  0.03  2.39 
Jordan 
min  0.00  0.01  1.40  0.00  0.01  2.15 
max  0.00  0.01  1.70  0.00  0.01  2.63 
average  0.00  0.01  1.55  0.02  0.03  2.39 
Lebanon 
min  0.00  0.03  1.40  0.00  0.01  2.15 
max  0.00  0.04  1.70  0.00  0.01  2.63 
average  0.00  0.04  1.55  0.02  0.03  2.39 
Tunisia 
min  0.00  0.01  1.40  0.00  0.01  2.15 
max  0.00  0.01  1.70  0.00  0.01  2.63 
average  0.00  0.01  1.55  0.02  0.03  2.39 
Morocco 
min  0.00  0.01  1.40  0.00  0.01  2.15 
max  0.00  0.04  1.70  0.00  0.01  2.63 
average  0.00  0.03  1.55  0.02  0.03  2.39 
Israel 
Min  0.17  -  1.40  0.17  0.01  2.15 
Max  0.18  -  1.70  0.18  0.01  2.63 
average  0.18  -  1.55  0.25  0.03  2.39 
Turkey 
Min  0.15  -  1.40  0.15  0.01  2.15 
Max  0.19  -  1.70  0.19  0.01  2.63 
average  0.17  -  1.55  0.19  0.03  2.39 
Source: own estimation. Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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Part 3: Conclusions and Policy 
Implications 
The main findings of this paper are the following: 
1.  The analysis of tariffs in Mediterranean countries shows that they are 
still significant in Algeria and Tunisia (to a lesser extent). In the other 
countries, tariffs are much lower, especially in Israel and Turkey which 
have almost completed their tariff liberalization.  
2.  Protection  due  to  NTMs  is  generally  much  greater  than  that  due  to 
tariffs (except for Algeria and Tunisia). In addition, the calculation of 
AVEs  shows  high  tariff-equivalents  for  Algeria  but  also  Jordan. 
Conversely, Morocco, Tunisia but also Egypt exhibit the lowest AVEs 
(less than 25%). 
3.  The implementation of a specific gravity model shows that trade costs 
significantly reduce MED countries’ imports from their partners in the 
Euromed area. In particular: 
a.  Tariffs are trade reducing, mainly in the countries which showed 
the highest tariff levels (Algeria and Tunisia). This suggests that 
the shallow integration was not fully achieved in these countries. 
b.  NTMs are significantly trade-reducing in all countries, especially 
in Algeria. On the other hand, they are less trade-reducing in Mo-
rocco and Tunisia, though significant. This means that eliminating 
NTMs in Mediterranean countries as a move toward deeper inte-
gration  in  the  Euromed  area  is  expected  to  provide  significant 
gains. 
c.  Transport costs significantly reduce trade in Mediterranean coun-
tries, as well as inefficiencies in logistics. 
4.  In the same way, trade costs significantly reduce exports from MED 
countries to their partners in the Euromed area. In particular: 
a.  Transport costs and logistics inefficiencies are particularly trade 
reducing. This is due to the gap between LPI in most MED coun-
tries on the one hand and the EU on the other hand. 
b.  NTMs are also export reducing but to a lesser extent than for im-
ports. This can mainly be explained by the fact that NTMs applied SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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to MED countries exports (especially by the EU) are lower than 
those applied to MED countries imports (by themselves).  
c.  Tariffs have small effects on exports, mainly because they have 
been removed in most countries in the Euromed area. 
5.  The calculation of trade creation due to shallow and deep integration 
reveals that: 
a.  Tariff removal is expected to produce moderate or limited gains, 
except  in  Algeria,  and  Tunisia  (to  a  lesser  extent),  since  both 
countries show higher tariffs than the other Mediterranean coun-
tries. Import increases are estimated to amount to 59% in Algeria 
and 42% in Tunisia. Egypt and Morocco show moderate import 
increases due to tariff removal (about 30%). For the other coun-
tries (Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Turkey), only a limited import 
increase can be expected from further shallow integration, since 
the potential gains have been almost fully achieved due to past tar-
iff liberalization, both multilaterally (GATT) and regionally (Bar-
celona agreement). The effects of tariff removal concerning ex-
ports of MED countries are also small, because most of their part-
ners in the Euromed area have already removed their tariffs. 
b.  Conversely, the elimination of NTMs is expected to lead to strong 
trade gains (while a marginal reduction in NTMs leads to much 
smaller gains because NTMs must be importantly reduced in order 
to provide significant gains). With regard to imports, the expected 
increase range from about 25% in Morocco and Tunisia to 60% in 
Algeria. The other countries are in intermediate positions, show-
ing imports increase which scales from 32% (Lebanon) to 39% 
(Egypt and Jordan). Exports increases, although significant (35%) 
are, however, smaller than import increases, because the NTMs 
applied by the EU to exports of the MED countries’ are lower 
than those applied by MED countries to their own imports. Over-
all, a strong trade creation is expected from deep integration. This 
result is consistent with that found in De Wulf and Maliszewska 
(2009). The main reason is that almost no progress has been made 
so far concerning the reduction in NTMs. 
c.  Trade gains due to deep integration can also been reinforced fur-
ther through the potential reduction in trade and logistics costs: as 
a matter of fact, import increases are expected to amount to up to 
30% for Morocco and 45% for Algeria. Export increases are even 
more important due to higher export elasticities to LPI than import 
elasticities. In any case, the trade gains are particularly significant Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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for the countries which show the greatest inefficiencies in their 
logistics, i.e. Algeria, Egypt and Morocco.  
d.  The particular case of South-South integration provides similar re-
sults, i.e. gains from deep integration (NTMs and logistics) are 
important, whereas gains due to shallow integration are moderate 
(except in Algeria which has not started its tariff liberalization 
process vis-a-vis the other GAFTA members) 
These results lead to the following policy implications
27: 
6.  Mediterranean countries should complete their shallow integration with 
their EU partners and across themselves as a means of capturing the 
remaining trade gains available. In particular, Algeria should take efforts 
to reduce its tariffs which currently remain at high levels. 
7.  Dealing with deep integration is a more difficult task. First, NTMs must 
be  addressed altogether,  since  we  have  shown  that the removal  of a 
particular  NTM  while  keeping  the  other  ones  provides  very  limited 
benefits.  As  a  result,  each  Mediterranean  country  should  identify 
precisely all NTMs for each product and decide whether to remove all 
NTMs for this product or not. Of course, the removal of all NTMs for 
all products is not necessarily the right solution, since some NTMs may 
be useful at product level for specific reasons (sanitary, etc.). 
8.  However, there are numerous NTMs in Mediterranean countries which 
strongly reduce trade. Some questions must be addressed with regard 
their removal for specific products, by eliminating para-tariff measures 
or moving towards mutual technical standard recognition. In any case, a 
cost-benefit  analysis  should  be  undertaken  at  product-level  before 
embarking  on  NTMs  elimination  (especially  in  terms  of  short  terms 
costs due to an increased competition with EU products). 
A second aspect of deep integration relates to the efficiency of logistics. In this 
regard, significant additional gains can be achieved through the extension of the 
Euro-Mediterranean integration as a means of improving LPI (port infrastructures, 
logistics services, etc.). In this regard, an increased cooperation in infrastructure 
related projects is required. In addition, extending the financial cooperation be-
tween the EU and Mediterranean countries (through specific EIB loans) can also 
help improving logistics' performance. 
                                                 
27 A broader analysis about policy implication of border management may also be found in 
McLinden, G. et al. (2011). SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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Annex 1: A Note on the MEDPRO 
Scenarios and their Relations with 
the Simulations Undertaken in 
This Study
28 
The four MEDPRO scenarios consist of 1) the reference scenario which entails 
continued partial cooperation through bilateral agreements among the EU mem-
bers and the MED countries with a failure to achieve sustainable development; 2) 
The Euro-Mediterranean as one global player scenario where common EU-MED 
frameworks of action on key topics including trade are set. In this case sustainabil-
ity is achieved via common targets and strategies; 3) The EU and the MED as 
regional players on the global stage is a scenario where multilateral agreements 
between the EU and the MED countries are undertaken to enhance cooperation on 
key topics. In this case the sustainability is achieved with separate pathways; and 
4) The Euro-Mediterranean area is under threat is a scenario where weakening 
and failure of cooperation schemes lead to possible disruption of EU institutions 
with the rising of regional conflicts in the MED area and certainly sustainability is 
not achieved. In fact, such scenarios coincide with the analysis undertaken in this 
study, yet not in a complete way. For example the reference scenario of MEDPRO 
is similar to the optimistic scenario in which only abolishment of tariffs takes 
place (shallow integration). In this case the gains from trade in terms of higher 
exports and imports between EU and MED countries or between MED countries 
are not high. The second and third scenarios dealing with The euro-Mediterranean 
as one global player and  The EU and the MED as regional players on the global 
stage  are  similar  to  the  optimistic  scenario  concerning  deep  integration  where 
trade gains are likely to be high especially if NTMs are abolished as well logistics 
related problems are solved. The improvement of logistics seems to have a signifi-
cant impact on trade creation and thus should be paid due attention from a policy-
making perspective. The fourth scenario of The euro-Mediterranean area is under 
threat is similar to the pessimistic scenario in which piecemeal measures (insignif-
icant reductions or increases in tariffs as well as NTMs) are not likely to enhance 
                                                 
28 By Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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(or reduce) trade in a significant manner whether between EU and MED countries 
or amongst MED countries themselves. SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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Annex 2: NTMs in the MED 
Countries Affecting Their Trade in 
the Euromed Area, and How EU 
Can Help
29 
Despite significant efforts undertaken to tackle NTMs in the MED countries, 
still there is a room for further actions to enhance trade between MED countries 
and the EU as well as amongst MED countries. This short review provides an 
overview of the efforts undertaken in the MED countries to combat NTMs and the 
remaining problems that require further actions, where EU can provide help. We 
identify the NTMs related to standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, cus-
toms procedures, intellectual property rights, competition, and government pro-
curement issues.  
Regarding standards, MED countries have undertaken several steps to harmo-
nize their national standards with the international ones and with those of the EU. 
MED countries are at different stages in terms of harmonizing their standards with 
the EU, but all have been progressing in an impressive manner. All MED coun-
tries which have been engaged with the EU in Association Agreements have made 
progress to negotiate an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of 
Industrial Products (ACAA). Despite the significant developments undertaken by 
MED countries in this regard, there is still a lack of mutual recognition agreements 
(MRAs) signed between MED countries and the EU or amongst themselves, with 
the exception of Israel (which has such an agreement with the EU). This situation 
reflects the absence of trust in the standards' procedures adopted in MED countries 
or the weak accreditation of domestic organizations, which have not been granted 
international recognition yet. In other words, there is a lack of credible compre-
hensive conformity assessment
30 systems that allow trust in the standards' systems 
                                                 
29 By Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim. This part is based on Ghoneim, Ahmed F. (2009), "Analy-
sis of NTBs in Euro-Med Zone", in Luc De Wulf and Maryla Maliszewska (eds.) Econom-
ic  Integration  in  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Region,  CASE  Network  Report  No.  89/2009 
available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1526992 
30 Conformity assessment is the name given to the processes that are used to dem onstrate 
that a product (tangible) or a service or a management system or body meets specified Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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in MED countries. A major dimension of the conformity assessment problem is 
associated with the lack of investments in related infrastructure including laborato-
ries and needed equipments. This situation could be improved with technical, and 
financial assistance from the EU so as to give greater confidence on the conformi-
ty assessment systems.  
Despite the progress made by the MED countries to harmonize their standards 
with international norms, several problems remain open, namely:  
  Labeling and packaging requirements for a wide array of imported goods 
seem to be the major NTMs identified in all MED countries as reported by 
the US in USTR reports or by the EU in different databases (market access 
databases). The specific labeling and packaging measures are strict when 
dealing with some items including foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals and tex-
tiles. Such measures result in increasing costs for exporters to MED coun-
tries including Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia. Available in-
formation identify that such measures also impeded an intraregional trade 
among MED countries themselves in the context of Agadir agreement.  
  Testing procedures at the borders differ depending on product and its sen-
sitivity and between individual MED countries. The testing procedures of-
ten lack uniformity and transparency.  
  Inadequately staffed and poorly equipped laboratories often yield faulty 
test results and cause lengthy delays.  
  Application of market surveillance systems which in most countries, ex-
cept for Israel and, to a lesser extent, Jordan, is still in its infancy. 
  The flexibility identified in choosing among different international stand-
ards as in the case of Israel and Egypt is not fully implemented which cre-
ates a large room for uncertainty among exporters to those countries. In 
Tunisia there is huge complexity for the application of import technical 
regulations, which affects negatively the clearance of goods from customs 
and has negative effect on the competitiveness of Tunisian firms.  
As in the case of standards, MED countries have been working on providing 
flexibility and harmonizing their SPS measures with international norms. For ex-
ample, in Egypt, a program was completed to identify mandatory and optional 
requirements in each new product standard. The new standards follow CODEX 
guidelines for safety and the protection of human health. A new National Food 
                                                                                                                           
requirements. Conformity assessment can cover testing, surveillance, inspecting, auditing, 
certification,  registration,  and  accreditation.  See 
http://www.iso.org/iso/resources/conformity_assessment/what_is_conformity_assessment.
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Safety Authority is expected to be established in the near future following the 
American model of FDA. Jordan has the majority of its announced SPS regula-
tions  WTO  consistent.  Moreover,  the  Jordan  Food  and  Drug  Administration 
(JFDA) has applied a risk-based system for inspection of imported food consign-
ments. Moreover, JFDA applies a risk-based assessment for domestic produced 
products as well. Other MED countries have undertaken similar measures to those 
adopted in Egypt and Jordan. 
Despite the efforts in SPS aspects there are a number of general problems that 
affect exporters to MED countries though they differ in the degree of their urgency 
as follows: 
  The issue of shelf-life and the ad hoc application of shelf life procedures 
for imported products is a major concern for food products exporters to 
MED countries. Jordan has undertaken positive developments in this re-
gard and has replaced the shelf life system with "best before". 
  Special religious requirements as the case of Halal meat and Kosher regu-
lations  cause  several  complications  for  specific  food  stuff  exporters  to 
MED countries regarding the procedures and certification requirements.  
  There are also a number of specific products that have been subject to SPS 
measures applied by MED countries on imports from the EU. For example 
bans on importation of live birds, their meat and product have been ap-
plied by Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Israel.  
  Moreover, there are a number of SPS measures that are country specific 
with no clear scientific basis, and is often cumbersome to fulfill.  
  MED countries face major problems in accessing each other markets due 
to the multiplicity of systems and documentations required in each coun-
try. Lack of transparency on SPS requirements and vague application has 
resulted in denial of market access for intra-Agadir exports, where imposi-
tion of ad hoc fees or simply denial of market access for a wide array of 
agricultural and processed food products has been the case.  
  Moreover, it is not clear to what extent national treatment is applied re-
garding SPS measures. Several incidents of non-complying with interna-
tional rules (e.g. Codex) are reported on the borders with no clear infor-
mation on whether the same treatment is applied to domestically produced 
goods. 
  Exporters from MED countries face high compliance costs associated with 
EU SPS standards, certificates, and measures as HACCP, EUREPGAP, 
and BRC. Though complying with such measures provides exporters with 
access to the EU markets, small producers and exporters have a difficult 
time to satisfy all these requirements. The traceability system has certainly Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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added extra compliance costs for exporters from MED countries to EU. 
All such additional costs when combined with EU agricultural production 
and export subsidies and erosion of preferences for MED countries due to 
the proliferation of EU regional trade agreements undermine the competi-
tiveness of MED countries' exports to the EU market.  
As for customs procedures, we observe that all MED countries have undertaken 
significant developments by including automated systems and reducing the num-
ber of procedures and steps needed for customs' clearance. Yet, as in the case of 
standards and SPS measures several NTMs still prevail. The EU support is needed 
in this area to ensure that deep integration materializes, and especially in the fol-
lowing areas: 
  Streamlining  customs  procedures for  intra MED  countries'  trade  would 
boost such trade that is still below its apparent potential. This might re-
quire establishing a monitoring mechanism to ensure compliance of MED 
countries with customs valuation. Also the EU could use its influence to 
persuade MED countries to eliminate extra charges and surcharges im-
posed on the intra MED trade especially in the context of Agadir agree-
ment. 
  Ensuring proper adoption of post-clearance audit which does not seem to 
be applied by all MED countries, and even when applied by some of them 
as Jordan, information indicate that the process is still in its infancy. 
  Provide assistance to correctly implement the WTO Customs Valuation 
Agreement 
  Assist with putting effective post clearance audit capacity in place includ-
ing training to improve technical procedures and capacity building. This 
could greatly contribute to faster release of imports.  
In  the  field  of  intellectual  property  rights  (IPRs),  all  MED  countries  have 
adopted legislations that are in compliance with TRIPS. However, all MED coun-
tries have problems with the enforcement of IPR laws and regulations and/or weak 
provisions in some of their legislation that at times make them non-compliant with 
TRIPS. The reports of main trading partners (US and EU) indicate there are some 
loopholes in the laws. Moreover, not all MED countries have adhered to TRIPS 
plus type international agreements to which most of the EU countries have signed. 
The EU could assist MED countries in reducing the circulation and trafficking of 
counterfeit/pirated goods and improve their compliance with TRIPS; this could 
involve: 
  Providing technical assistance to strengthen the capacity of MED coun-
tries to  monitor  violations  of TRIPS  provisions,  and  enhance  their  en-
forcement capabilities including upgrading of courts and judges responsi-SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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ble for handling TRIPS related cases, while ensuring that strengthening 
such measures will not have negative repercussions for social situation of 
MED countries such as increasing prices of medicines or basic educational 
copyright products.  
  Providing technical assistance to ensure compatibility with TRIPS in areas 
where MED countries still adopt non-complying measures. For example, 
the review of the US and EU reports identified that some MED countries 
still have loopholes in their national laws regarding their conformity with 
TRIPS including, for example, pharmaceuticals data in Israel, and patents 
and trade marks in Jordan. EU assistance in amending national laws is cer-
tainly needed, especially that foreign assistance in this field has been dom-
inated so far by the US. 
  Initiating or improving cooperation between the various national bodies in 
MED countries responsible for IPR enforcement. Such initiatives can be 
undertaken in a regional context as problems faced by individual countries 
in fighting counterfeit and pirated products are similar. 
In areas related to competition and government procurement, it is worth noting 
that MED countries are not so much advanced. For example, the competition leg-
islation in most MED countries is new and weakly applied, whereas the issue of 
liberalization of government procurement is still in its infancy. In this regard, what 
is needed from the EU is providing technical assistance to upgrade the institutions 
responsible for such issues, without emphasis on the need of harmonization with 
EU norms and regulations.  
In fostering greater competition the EU could support MED countries through: 
  Seek for an agreed upon definition of state aid that takes into account the 
differences in economic development, social and political structures be-
tween the MED countries and the EU. For example, the flexibility regard-
ing block exemptions for regulations currently adopted by the European 
Commission should be extended to MED countries and could cover issues 
as  basic  education,  mass  transportation,  and  other  areas  of  concern  to 
MED countries.  
  Enhance the capacity building of competition authorities in MED coun-
tries and the information databases they can use to ensure effective im-
plementation of competition laws and regulations (in terms of data, human 
capital, and means of fast and accurate investigations). 
  Ensure that de minimis regulation applied by the EU fits the developmen-
tal considerations of MED countries. Such agreement would enhance the 
chances of compliance.  Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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  Introduce new forms of cooperation (positive and negative comity agree-
ments among EU and MED countries competition authorities). 
  Ensure that there is progress made by MED countries to implement the 
competition related articles in the Association Agreements. 
  Investigate new potential for cooperation among sectoral regulators be-
tween the EU and MED countries and among MED countries themselves. 
  Finally, among the areas that do not appear extensively in the EU docu-
ments (action plans and progress reports) and that should receive more at-
tention is the cooperation among sectoral regulators in areas such as public 
utilities and telecommunications. In this regard cooperation in terms of 
twining projects (currently some of them are already in place) could be 
expanded.  The  main  emphasis  here  could  be  on  the  transfer  of  EU 
knowledge and expertise in managing such sectors (e.g. electricity, water, 
and telecommunications) to MED countries.  
In the area of government procurement, the EU can help as follows: 
  An alternative to reaching a regional agreement with respect to govern-
ment procurement would be to aim at sectoral and bilateral agreements be-
tween the EU and the MED countries. This could take into account the 
sensitivity of some sectors in particular countries.  
  Transparency could be enhanced by clarifying the criteria for using excep-
tions to open tenders; defining a time limit to take procurement decisions.  
  The EU could strive to obtain the same rights as granted to American 
firms under the different FTAs, memoranda of understandings, and offset 
agreements in their trade negotiations with MED countries. 
This review of NTMs prevailing between EU and MED countries identified 
main areas for intervention and support by the EU to MED countries. The nature 
of support differs where in some cases technical and financial assistance is highly 
needed to strengthen the capacity of MED countries as in the area of standards and 
SPS measures. Areas of standards and SPS measures require more technical and 
financial assistance to upgrade the level of conformity assessment procedures and 
infrastructure. This will enable MRAs to be concluded and hence will enhance the 
market access of MED countries' products in the EU with a higher degree of trust.  
In some areas there is a need of EU assistance to enhance South-South trade 
among MED countries. The assistance can take the shape of ensuring that MED 
countries comply with policies and regulations that are in line with their WTO 
obligations or EU Association Agreements when trading with each other. EU can 
assist  by  helping  MED  countries  establish  some  monitoring  mechanisms  for 
NTMs affecting their intra-regional trade. SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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Annex 3: Description of 
Mediterranean Trade and 
Protection Database
31 
The Annex 3 intends to serve as a reference source for the trade and protection 
database. This annex presents and details the major variables in the database by 





Trade data comes from UN Comtrade database. The database reports, in its 
standard form, exports and imports at HS 6 digit level. Since this classification is 
standard to all countries, it is possible to make comparisons between products in 
different countries. The data reported in this database has been aggregated into HS 
2 digits or chapter level. 
The database only considered bilateral exports and imports reported by each of 
the 10 Mediterranean countries analyzed within them and to the 27 countries of the 
European Union.  
The Harmonized System has been started to be gradually implemented in 1988. 
This implies that it is impossible to get trade data under a common classification 
system before that year. However, the implementation has been slow and the earli-
est data at the required classification do not go beyond 1990. However, this data 
was not available for all countries. Excluding Syria, the earliest year with trade 
data for all reporters is 1997. Table 13 presents the value of trade by country and 
year and it also shows the trade data availability. 
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Table 13. Exports in millions of USD dollars by reporter and year 
   Algeria  Egypt  Israel  Jordan  Leba-
non 
Moroc-
co  Syria  Tunisia  Turkey 
1990  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  8282.1 
1991  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3028.7  8846.7 
1992  7935.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3328.4  9490.6 
1993  6697.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2587.6  0.0  3164.8  9256.8 
1994  5932.5  2035.0  0.0  277.4  0.0  2775.3  0.0  3779.3  10600.0 
1995  6374.9  2061.5  5705.0  337.0  0.0  3180.6  0.0  4501.8  13700.0 
1996  7209.8  2332.9  6209.5  0.0  0.0  3144.7  0.0  4472.0  14100.0 
1997  9359.3  2280.3  6560.2  315.0  283.5  3002.5  0.0  4478.8  15000.0 
1998  6616.7  1668.8  7010.4  265.3  293.9  5307.1  0.0  4659.0  16900.0 
1999  8850.4  1745.8  8801.3  391.4  301.5  5789.7  0.0  5116.1  18100.0 
2000  15500.0  2526.2  9745.4  337.2  283.3  5839.5  0.0  5101.8  17900.0 
2001  13700.0  1883.2  8694.5  400.5  344.3  5443.1  4121.2  5779.6  20300.0 
2002  13600.0  1863.6  8373.3  576.9  390.0  6056.6  5055.8  5994.2  23100.0 
2003  16300.0  2810.2  9652.7  496.1  452.9  6956.3  4566.7  7140.1  31100.0 
2004  19600.0  3938.7  11900.0  627.4  598.4  7683.7  3797.9  8737.9  41400.0 
2005  28300.0  4863.4  13600.0  737.5  697.5  8592.1  4998.1  9349.3  47100.0 
2006  31600.0  6082.1  14100.0  829.3  718.8  9585.7  6497.3  10100.0  54500.0 
2007  29400.0  6573.2  13500.0  999.9  1029.5  11000.0  7713.5  13500.0  68100.0 
2008  46400.0  13300.0  19400.0  1281.3  1263.2  12800.0  0.0  15900.0  73900.0 




Typical gravity variables come from CEPII gravity database. These dataset in-
cludes several  variables  to  measure  different issues that  explain  trade  between 
countries such as distance, common language, legal system, etc. It also includes 
mass variables such as GDP and population. We have supplemented these mass 
variables by including World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) GDP 




Tariff data comes from UNCTAD Trains database. The data was extracted a 
HS 2 digits in order to make it compatible with the trade database. Table 14 pre-
sents the average MFN tariff applied by country and year. It also shows the tariff 
data availability. Three different types of tariffs are provided by TRAINS: SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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  MFN  (Most  Favourable  Nation)  tariff.  It  is  the  standard,  non-
discriminatory tariff applied to any WTO member. It is, in general, the 
highest tariff applied to any WTO member.  
  AHS (Effectively applied tariff): If preferential tariffs exist for a pair re-
porter-partner, TRAINS  reports  as the effectively  applied tariffs as the 
lower of the two. Therefore, the AHS is the minimum between the prefer-
ential (if it is available) and the MFN tariff.  
  PRF (Preferential tariff): It is the tariff applied in a bilateral agreement. It 
is generally lower than the MFN tariffs. 
It is important to remark that the tariffs reported by TRAINS are composition-
al. This implies that in calculations (averages, standard deviations, etc.) only tariff 
lines where imports are available were considered. Therefore the average tariff at 2 
HS digits, for example, only considers those tariffs where trade flows are availa-
ble.  
 
Table 14. Mean MFN tariff applied by country and year 
   Algeria  Egypt  Israel  Jordan  Lebanon  Morocco  Syria  Tunisia  Turkey 
1990                   
1991                   
1992                29.58   
1993  23.44          67.05      9.41 
1994                   
1995    28.36            31.19  10.07 
1996                   
1997  25.78          23.6      9.84 
1998  25.01  24.53            31.98   
1999          13.05        11.73 
2000        25.82  19.58  34.84       
2001  23.14      18.48  9.42  35.07       
2002  20.52  45.88    18.04  8.33  34.09  14.92  36.72   
2003  19.78      16.31    33.3    32.19  8.51 
2004    35.82  7.19    8.19      32.25   
2005  20.39  31.12  7.31  17.11  8.38  30.48    31.35  8.46 
2006  20.4    7.08  14.67  8.35  27.9    31.78  7.27 
2007  20.18    6.59  14.56  7.34  26.27      9.08 
2008  20.36  29.4  6.69      24.04      8.29 
2009  20.19          20.79      9.31 
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Non-tariff measures 
 
By definition, a non-tariff measure (NTM) is any other measure that does not 
adopt the form of a tax on the value or quantity imported. This constitutes a major 
problem to quantify and analyse this type of measures. NTMs can adopt a very 
wide range of forms; from sanitary measures (requirement of certificates) until 
price control measures. The final effect is to restrict imports by making trade oper-
ations costly and cumbersome.  
NTMs can be applied to the whole universe of products regardless of their 
origin. Typical types of measures are the requirements of labeling the product with 
its origin or that the agents involved in any trade operation must be registered in 
the imported country. This type of measure, in principle, has the effect of reducing 
a general level of imports. However, their effects tend to be minimal. 
Specific products may be also subjected to NTMs regardless of the origin. This 
type of measure addresses some risks or potential dangers associated with the 
trade of a particular product. Typical examples are the sanitary requirements to be 
met in order to import food products such as certificates, quarantines, mandatory 
inspections, etc. However, this type of measures is very effective to control the 
inflow of particular type of products that could be in competition with local pro-
ducers. Therefore, it is often argued that true health concerns are used to disguise 
market protection measures. 
NTMs, on the other hand, can be applied to specific products and specific ori-
gins. This type of measures is used when a risk has been identified in a particular 
origin for a particular product. For example, bans of imports of chilled or frozen 
beef from countries with outbreaks of food and mouth disease. Also, they are ap-
plied when a disloyal practice is suspected or identified in a particular origin for a 
particular  product.  In  this  case, antidumping  duties  or  retaliation  measures  are 
applied to correct this distortion. The trade distortion effect of scu a measure is 
very high and it is applied both to address true concerns and with intention to pro-
tect the domestic market from competitive suppliers. 
NTMs could be applied to a particular country in respect to all products. These 
measures are forbidden by the WTO given its discriminatory nature, but they have 
been applied in the past in traumatic situations. The example is a trade embargo.  
Finally, the effect of NTMs is not limited to the main parties involved. Third 
countries may be affected by the introduction of restriction to a competitor, for 
example. In this case, trade will be diverted away from the NTBs affected country 
towards the country not affected by the measure. Therefore, it is convenient also to 
analyse if NTBs have been applied to other partners. SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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As we have seen, NTMs can adopt a wide variety of forms. TRAINS have an 
extensive list of all type of either tariff or para-tariffs measures applied. Its codifi-
cation assigns a 4 digit code to each measure. However, it is possible to distin-
guish eight groups of them: 
1.  Tariffs. All different type of tariff and taxes applied exclusively to im-
ported products. MFN and preferential tariffs are included in this group 
but also special tariffs levied due to safeguards or retaliation. 
2.  Different type of charges and taxes applied to finance specific services 
such as inspections or statistical services. It also includes taxes applied 
to goods regardless their origin (either domestic or imported) such as 
general sales tax. 
3.  Administered prices. Here are included all different type of measures 
that affect the price at which product is imported. Within this category it 
is possible to find price controls, minimum import price requirements, 
price undertaking, etc. Some safeguards and antidumping duties are ap-
plied through this channel. 
4.  Financial measures. These are measures that affect the finances of im-
port operations. Among these types of measures it is possible to find re-
fundable deposits to be made before the operation or advance payments 
of custom duties. It is possible to find some restrictions on the operation 
of foreign exchange such as multiple exchange rates, restrictions on the 
operation in foreign currency.  
5.  Automatic licenses: Licenses are administrative procedures that require 
the submission of an application or other documentation (besides those 
required for custom purposes) as a prior condition for the importation of 
goods. When the license is granted automatically, the required adminis-
trative procedure fulfils some non-protection objective such as statistical 
data collection. The approval of the application is granted in all cases. It 
also includes, without restricting imports, surveillance of some sensitive 
products (chemicals, food, etc.). 
6.  Non-automatic licenses and other quantitative restrictions: When licens-
es are non-automatic, some government body must authorize the opera-
tion. This licenses or permits are required to control the trade on very 
sensitive and dangerous products (arms, potentially dangerous chemi-
cals, etc.). However, non-automatic licenses could act as a protection 
measure that makes imports operation subject to discretion and risk. 
Quotas and other type of quantitative restrictions are included in this 
group. Quotas basically limit the amount of a particular product to be 
imported. It may adopt the form of a tariff rate quota, where a deter-Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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mined amount of good is subject to a given rate but any additional quan-
tity are taxed at higher (frequently prohibitive rate). 
In this group it is also possible to find other types of administered trade 
such as agreements between countries to restrict or control movement of 
some products such as the Multifibre agreement or voluntary export re-
straint agreements. Finally, products that are prohibited in the importing 
country such as alcoholic beverages are included in this group. 
7.  Monopolistic measures: In this group it is possible to find measures that 
try to preserve some monopolistic power in the importing country. Typ-
ical here are operations that must be done by government trading com-
panies or agencies. Also, it is possible to find products that must be im-
ported through single channels either public or private. Moreover, re-
quirements of using or contracting national services such as transport or 
insurance in the import operation are typical in this group and may in-
crease the price of the imported good. 
8.  Technical  or  quality  regulations:  these  are  measures  aimed  to  assure 
some  minimum levels of quality of the product or that the imported 
product meets the same specification as the domestic product. In gen-
eral, these measures are implemented in order to satisfy the domestic 
technical regulations by the imported products. Regulations on packag-
ing and labeling (including quality assurance in product information) be-
long to this group.  
Sometimes, products are also required to pass some technical tests to 
find if they meet the domestic regulations.  
These types of measures can be also used to protect domestic production. La-
beling requirements may preclude the possibility of using some description be-
cause the domestic regulations are not met. Countries may have, for example, dif-
ferent criteria to establish the amount of cocoa that a chocolate bar may contain in 
order to be labeled as “chocolate”.  
We have considered these eight types of measures separately in the database by 
distinguishing the scope of the measure (general measures, product specific, coun-
try-product specific). Within each chapter we present the number of measures of 
each type applied. The number of measures applied may be a poor proxy of the 
effectiveness of a NTM. A single measure could be sufficient to stop imports, 
making the rest of the measures redundant. However, it is very hard to measure the 
effectiveness of a single NTM. Since we are considering aggregated data, chapters 
with a higher number of measures applied will reveal some intention of control the 
flow of this type of products. Therefore, the measure chosen may be a good ap-
proximation to the restrictions in place.  SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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Finally, we have also reported the number of measures by type applied to third 
countries not included in the database since it could be a very interesting variable 
to analyze. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to find series of NTMs applied. It was possi-
ble to identify only one year of data available for each country. The NTMs data is 




Reporter: 3 letter code for the reporter. Only Mediterranean countries were 
considered as reporters. 
Partner: 3 letter code for the partner. Partners are considered each of the 10 
Mediterranean countries plus the 27 EU countries. 
Product: 2 digits HS heading. 
Val000M. Imports declared by reporters in thousands of USD dollars imported 
from partner 
Val000X. Exports declared by reporters in thousands of USD dollars exported 
to partners. 
 
CEPII gravity database 
 
Contig. It takes value 1 if the pair reporter-partner shares a common border. 
Comlang_off. It takes value 1 if the pair reporter-partner shares a common offi-
cial language. 
Comlag_ethno: It takes value 1 if the pair reporter-partner shares a language 
spoken by at least 9% of the population. 
Comcol: It takes values 1 if the pair reporter-partner had a common colonizer 
before 1945. For example, Algeria and Tunisia. 
Distw: It is the weighted distance. It is the distance between the main cities of 
both reporter and partner weighted by the share of each city in total country popu-
lation. 
Pop_o: Origin (reporter) country population in mn. Source: CEPII 
Gdp_o: Origin (reporter) current GDP in mn in USD. Source: CEPII 
Gdpcap_o: Origin (reporter) current GDP per capita in USD. Source: CEPII 
Area_o: Origin (reporter) area in square kilometres. Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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Pop_d: Destination (partner) country population in mn. Source: CEPII 
Gdp_d: Destination (partner) current GDP in mn in USD. Source: CEPII 
Gdpcap_d:  Destination  (partner)  current  GDP  per  capita  in  USD.  Source: 
CEPII 
Area_d: Destination (partner) area in square kilometres. 
Tdiff: Number of hour difference between reporter and partner 
Heg_d: Destination (partner) is current of former hegemon of origin (reporter) 
Conflict: Takes value one if war 
Indepdate: Independece date if colony variable==1 
Heg_o: Origin (reporter) is current of former hegemon of destination (partner) 
Col_to: takes 1 for trade from heg_o to colony 
Col_fr: takes 1 for trade from colony to heg_d 
Colony: takes 1 for pair ever in colonial relationship 
Curcol: takes 1 for pair currently in colonial relationship 
Empire: Indicates the empire reporter used to be part 
Gatt_o: takes 1 if origin (reporter) is GATT/WTO member 
Gatt_d: takes 1 if destination (partner) is GATT/WTO member 
Rta: takes 1 if a regional trade agreement exists between reporter and partner 
Leg_o: Indicates the legal regime in the origin (reporter) 
Leg_d: Indicates the legal regime in the destination (partner) 
Comleg: Indicates if the reporter and partner share the legal regime 
Comrelig: Indicates if the reporter and partner share the religion 
Entry_cost_o: Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita) in the 
origin (reporter) 
Entry_tp_o: Days and procedures to start a business in the origin (reporter) 
Entry_cost_d: Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita) in the 
destination (partner) 
Entry_tp_d: Days and procedures to start a business in the destination (partner) 
Comcur: If partner and reporter have a common currency 
Gsp: If the partner grants GSP preference to reporter 
 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database 
 
GDPcnst2000_o: Origin’s (reporter) GDP in constant 2000 USD. Source: WDI SHALLOW VS DEEP INTEGRATIOM BETWEEN MED COUNTRIES AND THE EU… 
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GDPPPP05_o: Origin’s (reporter) GDP in purchasing power parity 2005 USD. 
Source: WDI 
GDPcurr_o: Origin’s (reporter) GDP in current USD. Source: WDI 
GDPcurrPPP_o: Origin’s (reporter) GDP PPP current in USD: Source: WDI 
Population_o: Origin’s (reporter) population. Source: WDI 
GDPcnst2000_d: Destination’s (partner) GDP in constant 2000 USD. Source: 
WDI 
GDPPPP05_d: Destination’s (partner) GDP in purchasing power parity 2005 
USD. Source: WDI 
GDPcurr_d: Destination’s (partner) GDP in current USD. Source: WDI 
GDPcurrPPP_d: Destination’s (partner) GDP PPP current in USD: Source: 
WDI 
Population_d: Destination’s (partner) population. Source: WDI 
 
Trains Tariffs database 
 
Tar_savgAHS: Origin’s Effectively applied simple average tariff 
Tar_wavgAHS: Origin’s Effectively applied weighted average tariff 
Tar_sdAHS: Standard Deviation of the effectively applied tariff in the origin 
country 
Tar_minAHS: Minimum effectively applied tariff in the origin country 
Tar_maxAHS: Maximum effectively applied tariffs in the origin country 
Tar_nbrlinesAHS: Number of lines in the chapter in the origin country 
Tar_intlpeakAHS: Effectively applied tariff number of International Peaks in 
the origin country 
Tar_savgMFN: Origin’s MFN applied simple average tariff 
Tar_wavgMFN: Origin’s MFN applied weighted average tariff 
Tar_sdMFN: Standard Deviation of the MFN tariff in the origin country 
Tar_minMFN: Minimum MFN tariff in the origin country 
Tar_maxMFN: Maximum MFN tariffs in the origin country 
Tar_nbrlinesMFN: Number of lines in the chapter in the origin country 
Tar_intlpeakMFN:  Effectively  MFN  number  of  International  Peaks  in  the 
origin country 
Tar_savgPRF: Origin’s preferential applied simple average tariff Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, et al. 
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Tar_wavgPRF: Origin’s preferential applied weighted average tariff 
Tar_sdPRF: Standard Deviation of the preferential tariff in the origin country 
Tar_minPRF: Minimum preferential tariff in the origin country 
Tar_maxPRF: Maximum preferential tariffs in the origin country 
Tar_nbrlinesPRF: Number of lines in the chapter in the origin country 
Tar_intlpeakPRF: Effectively preferential number of International Peaks in the 
origin country 